When Representatives Work: The Influence of Local Context on Minority Representation by Carroll, Kristen Monique
 WHEN REPRESENTATIVES WORK: THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL CONTEXT 




KRISTEN MONIQUE CARROLL 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Chair of Committee,  Kenneth J. Meier 
Committee Members, Manuel Teodoro 
 Francisco Pedraza 
 Kalena Cortes 




Major Subject: Political Science 
 
Copyright 2017 Kristen Monique Carroll 
  ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Representative bureaucracy theory often explains representation without a 
discussion of agency context. However, in many agencies not only is there a lack of 
support to develop a passively representative workforce, but there also exists little 
support for active representation. Scholars have recently developed a theory of context 
that describes various characteristics of the organizational context as a conditioning 
variable on management and performance. This research explores how agency contexts 
will potentially improve or mitigate the effect of minority representation on minority 
student outcomes. The research addresses three contextual characteristics: the 
organization’s financial uncertainty, the organization’s social context, and the 
organization’s political context. I explore my research question in the context of U.S. 
local public education. Within the research, I use a national survey dataset that captures 
bureaucratic representation in the largest U.S. school districts, funding data provided by 
the National Center of Education Statistics, and a unique dataset on school district social 
capital. The findings indicate first that in the midst of financial stress, negative changes 
in revenue dedicated to the technical core of the school district (instructional 
expenditures) will decrease the expected impact of minority teachers on student 
outcomes. Likewise, increases in bureaucratic investment will significantly improve the 
ability of minority teachers to affect minority student outcomes. Next, although overall 
levels of social capital are negatively or insignificantly related to minority social 
opportunity and outcomes, minority teachers are increasingly effective when minority 
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social capital can act as a co-productive facilitator for the bureaucracy. Last, this 
research finds that minority bureaucrats are more effective representatives when various 
political actors support their representative behaviors. The exact political control actor 
differs by racial minority group. I conclude that minority representation is influenced by 
various contextual characteristics within the local school district and addressing these 
characteristics can potentially affect minority client outcomes in public programs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The fact that my skin color matches that of my students doesn’t give me any 
superpowers as an educator. But it does give me the ability to see them in a way that’s 
untarnished by the stereotypes, biases and cultural disconnects that fuel inequality and 
injustice…”  
-David Jackson, a ninth-grad teacher in the New York City area 
 
In 1982, the Little Rock School District sued the Pulaski County Special School 
District (PCSSD) for inhibiting their discrimination efforts. In response the district hired 
a director for their gifted and talented programing who took on various advocacy efforts 
to change the nature of its student composition. Between 1988 and 1998 Black student 
representation in the Pulaski Country gifted and talented program grew from 14 to 26 
percent. And as of 2003, the PCSSD was considered one of the most progressive school 
districts in Arkansas. Although the changes in Pulaski County were rooted in the courts, 
the distinct advocacy efforts to promote minority students in gifted programming did not 
happen by chance.  
One the first challenges the PCSSD gifted director recognized was that reaching 
African-American parents would require the help of African-American educators. Black 
student representation could not be addressed until the underrepresentation of Black 
teachers in the gifted program was addressed as well. And in 1998, 25 percent of the 
gifted facilitators in the district were Black. 
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Next, PCSSD gifted director addressed the fact that the infrastructure for successful 
gifted programming was simply unavailable in majority minority schools. This prompted 
the intentional improvement of school facilities in predominantly Black attendance zone. 
By introducing specialty programs, students in schools that were typically avoided were 
now given access to the same programming available to their white peers.  
Increasing Black student representation would be similarly impossible if the district 
had not made changes in their communication with the Black community. Because many 
minority communities have experienced isolation and discrimination in public 
programming, the Black community in Pulaski County did not trust what they perceived 
to be a ‘special’ program. Thus the director needed to convince a hesitant and distrusting 
community that gifted programs would effectively serve the needs of their students and 
enhance their educational opportunities. 
Finally, in order to increase support within the district and improve efforts toward 
their desegregation plans, the director looked beyond education proponents and to 
political advocates within the community. Specifically, the director located traditional 
Black organizations such as the Urban League and churches that would hold the plan 
accountable and promote its benefits within the community (Grantham 2003). 
Although the story and successes in Pulaski County were evident nearly 20 years 
ago, they demonstrate a phenomenon occurring across public programs today. 
Specifically, minority clients are on the losing side of inequitable resource distribution in 
programs from public education to public welfare services and public health. Public 
organizations are attempting to address these issues while they themselves have not 
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recruited adequate bureaucratic representation, are not dedicating resources to majority-
minority jurisdictions, spend little effort engaging with the community, and focus 
increased attention on political stakeholders but oddly ignore the interests of their public 
constituents. Using PCSSD’s advocacy efforts as a guide, this research will explore how 
the economic, social, and political contexts of local school districts will influence 
minority teacher representation.  
The remainder of this chapter will proceed in the following order. First, I will 
highlight the importance of representation in the public administration literature. I then 
describe how organizational context is a significant factor that should be considered 
when discussing administrative processes such as, representation. Next, I outline the 
dissertation by introducing each empirical chapter and its research question. After 
describing the empirical work and its suggestive findings, I will conclude by explaining 
the case selection of this dissertation research and its value to the representative 
bureaucracy literature. 
1.1 Representative Bureaucracy 
Public administration scholars have repeatedly researched the positive outcomes of 
representation on democracy and client groups (Riccucci et al 2014, Roch et al 2010, 
Meier and Stewart 1991). More recently this literature has explored cases where 
representation’s correlation with positive outcomes is hindered by organizational barriers 
(Wilkins and Williams 2008, Roch and Pitts 2012). In other words, there are systemic 
barriers operating within organizations that prevent passive representation from 
translating to active representation. While this phenomenon is easily recognized in 
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organizations with strong professional cultures such as law enforcement or charter 
schools, this research seeks to uncover the overlooked resources that help to translate 
passive minority representation into positive minority outcomes.  
Beginning with passive representation or the degree to which the bureaucracy 
mirrors groups in society, Mosher (1968) and Krislov (2012) explain that having a 
bureaucracy that is representative of various client groups will introduce new ideas into 
the bureaucracy and improve bureaucratic operations. Passive representation can 
additionally improve outcomes by creating a role-model effect for clients and providing 
symbolic value to democratic public institutions (Atkins and Wilkins 2013, Meier and 
Nicholson-Crotty 2006, Riccucci et al 2014). Passive representation will then translate to 
active representation as minority bureaucrats act on behalf of minority clients or 
influence the actions of nonminority colleagues. Empirical research indicates that 
representation has the ability to influence organizational performance, policy outcomes, 
and minority client outcomes beyond the mission of the agency (Roch et al 2010, Keiser 
et al 2002, Zhu and Walker 2013, Atkins and Wilkins 2013).  
While the majority of research on active representation discusses the bureaucratic 
outcomes of representation, there must first be a decision on behalf of the bureaucrat to 
act in the interests of one’s group (Pitkin 1967). Sowa and Selden (2003) describe this 
decision as a bureaucrat taking on the representative role. In research on housing loans, 
the authors find that the more a bureaucrat perceives their role to be that of a minority 
representative the better they will represent clients. Taking on the representative role, 
however, is influenced by a variety of subjective characteristics. The primary 
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characteristic assumes a shared group identity (Selden 1997). While identity is often 
assumed to be the only subjective criteria on which active representation depends, 
identity salience is an additional subjective quality that is equally if not more important 
for active representation. Identity salience or what some refer to, as an individual’s 
strength of identity will differ among minority individuals. A bureaucrat who identifies 
with migrant individuals may decide to take on a representative role because they have 
similar first-hand accounts of the experience of a migrant. Yet, those with experiences 
that are far removed may identify with the group but choose not to act on their behalf 
because they do not share experiences.  
However, the common assumption that identity equates to active representation has 
disregarded the subjective values and decision that goes into being an active 
representative. Understanding that active representation is a decision determined by 
individual and bureaucratic values is then critical when discussing the micro-processes 
of representation. The literature’s quantitative approach to research on representative 
bureaucracy and limits to the data may be one reason why it has failed to explore this 
decision-making process.  
Nonetheless, being an effective representative is also tied to the discretion and 
support minority bureaucrats experience within their agency. It is well known in the 
literature that without discretion active representation is virtually impossible. The reason 
being is because when the organization’s culture allows for discretion, the individual 
values of the agents can have a greater effect on implementation (Kelly 1994). Likewise, 
sufficient discretion is not always available to government agents because most 
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organizations operate with standard operating procedures and formal processes that limit 
individual agent discretion (Downs 1967). Even more than the actual level of discretion, 
bureaucrats must perceive themselves to have the support of their organization or 
profession. When there is a lack of approval or when bureaucrats fear that their efforts 
are not supported, they may fail to take risks or pursue actions that produce positive 
outcomes for underrepresented groups (Carroll 2017). 
1.2 Organizational Context 
An organization’s context can then produce a variety of external pressures that will 
affect bureaucratic behavior.  Context in public administration is described as a factor 
that fundamentally changes the relationship between management and performance 
(O’Toole and Meier 2014). The ability to be an active representative may similarly be 
influenced by organizational context.  
Within the representative bureaucracy literature context has been discussed in three 
different ways. First, research by Meier and Hawes (2009) discussed the influence of 
national context on representative bureaucracy.  By looking specifically at the French 
context, the authors determined that the concept of representative bureaucracy differs 
across international settings. In France, for instance, bureaucracy was never perceived to 
be a democratic institution. Instead, it was established for elites and was not intended to 
be representative of citizens. Because the intentions of bureaucratic institutions and the 
perceptions of race differ within the French context, witnessing the effects of a 
representative bureaucracy would be all but impossible in certain national contexts.  
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Andrews, Groeneveld, Meier, and Schroter (2016) renew this discussion explaining 
that context will condition the impact of bureaucratic representation on outcomes such 
as, organizational policies and performance. Drawing on Meier and Hawes (2009) the 
authors explain the importance of how national context and administrative traditions 
shape the meaning of representation. But more importantly, these authors describe 
context as a factor that will directly affect the opportunities or constraints for active 
representation. Context will interact with representation by changing the impact of 
bureaucratic behaviors on performance.  
Last, Meier and Morton (2010) introduce context as a variable that will structure 
identities and identity salience in a bureaucracy. They argue that a representative 
bureaucracy requires that individual bureaucratic identities are salient in the national, 
organizational, and individual context to promote action on behalf of clients. For 
instance, class cleavages create a salient identity in the Indian national context, but are 
not as influential in other countries. A bureaucrat can then only take on the 
representative role when structural characteristics of the bureaucracy (at the national or 
organizational level) have made their identity relevant.  
Beyond discussing context and its effect on identity, Meier and Morton (2010) do 
comment that, “passive representation…is a characteristic while active representation is 
a process.” While the authors clearly view active representation as a process for 
individual bureaucrats, beyond identity they do not discuss what goes into that process 
and what contextual factors may interrupt it. Therefore the question remains, once the 
salience of identity is established, how might context affect the bureaucrat’s behavior or 
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ability to be an active representative? I expect that passive representation will fail to 
translate into active representation when various dimensions of context increase the costs 
of representation or simply make active representation more difficult for minority 
bureaucrats. The contexts to be examined in this research include the economic context 
of the organization, the social and community context of the organization, and the 
political context of the organization. 
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation 
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Active Representation and Rationality 
In order to understand the micro-processes of bureaucratic representation, it is 
necessary to recognize how different social identities interact and are activated under 
various circumstances. Within this chapter, I theoretically explain how specific contexts 
potentially activate social identities that promote bureaucratic behaviors. Using the logic 
of rational choice political behavior and social identity theory, this chapter presents a 
broad theory and illustration of how environmental context will influence bureaucratic 
actions.  
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Economic Context 
 In the first empirical chapter, I explore the influence of economic turbulence on 
minority representation.  Dess and Beard (1984) explain the three dimensions of 
organizational task environments as munificence, complexity, and dynamism. Low 
munificence describes organizations that suffer from unstable economic resources. In 
fact, Meier (1993) appropriately expects that minimal resources will mitigate active 
representation.  
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 In addition, complexity describes the diversity of the organization’s client population 
(Andrews et al 2005, Fernandez 2005). In the context of representative bureaucracy, the 
issue of complexity indicates that as diversity increases more active representation will 
be needed to address various client goals. Finally, dynamism describes the change over 
time or the frequency and size of munificence or shifts in complexity. It is expected that 
organizations operating in an environment of high dynamism are likely to have 
formulated techniques to adjust to continuous shocks. The combination of these three 
dimensions results in environmental turbulence or the “unpredictable change in the 
munificence and complexity of an organization’s environment” (Boyne and Meier 
2009b, 803).   
Environmental turbulence has been found to lead to poor performance of 
organizations (Boyne and Meier 2009b). However, this is mitigated by internal structural 
stability. Thus, when organizations experience environmental turbulence, a good 
organization will readjust to create some level of internal stability to maintain 
performance (Meier and O’Toole 2009). However, the incorporation of increased 
internal stability can potentially come in the form of increased rules and structures that 
limit the bureaucrat’s role and level of discretion. In addition, in instances of 
environmental turbulence, bureaucrats are pressed to focus on more clear and concise 
goals that are perceived as higher priority. For instance, when a school system is faced 
with a huge influx of students, the organization is charged with maintaining overall 
performance. In the midst of turbulence, the time allotted toward and the ability to be an 
active minority representative can be potentially suppressed. This adjustment in order to 
  10 
buffer against environmental shocks is expected regardless of the level of discretion 
inherent in the bureaucracy. As a result, active representation is not always a feasible 
option for the minority bureaucrat who desires to promote the interests of co-minority 
clients. 
 Within this chapter I identify two sources of financial stress that can potentially 
influence representation. Specifically, I observe the effect of unexpected changes in total 
revenue compared to the unexpected changes in resources that are devoted to the 
bureaucratic core of the organization. Within public education these differences are 
visible in total revenue versus revenue devoted to instructional expenditures. Total 
revenue includes a combination of federal, state, and local funds. Instructional 
expenditures are instead devoted to teacher salary, teacher assistants, and additional 
programming. The results indicate that resources matter for representation when 
dedicated to the bureaucratic core of an organization. By comparing these two funding 
measures, I hope to explain how managerial processes can be used to influence 
representation and continue to promote positive gains even in a time of financial stress.  
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Social Context 
In the second empirical chapter I continue to observe the influence of context by 
exploring the community context of local school districts. Every public organization 
operates in a local community context, which may either provide support or create 
challenges for bureaucrats. In the education context, schools exist as a center of their 
community. Because schools are managed by local elected school boards and funded by 
local property taxes, the relationship between the community and education outcomes is 
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central. Yet, little research has explored how variation in community involvement 
between racial groups will influence local school outcomes. In this chapter, literature on 
social capital and public administration collaboration are used to explore how 
community involvement can create a supportive context for minority bureaucrats.  
Research on social capital or the “networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants 
to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 1995, 664),” 
explores the influence of community on broad outcomes. Social capital theory has 
consistently explained that social capital and our relations with others in the community 
influence a communities’ ability to solve collective problems or attain positive 
outcomes. On multiple occasions social capital is understood to improve education 
performance (John 2005, Putnam 2000), health outcomes (Lochner et al 2003), crime 
rates (Rosenfeld et al 2001) and poverty (Hero 2003). Yet, some inconsistent findings 
have prompted theoretical questions that exhibit a lack of understanding of the 
relationship between social capital among racial minority groups.  
When scholars began to disaggregate the effect of social capital by race, research 
finds that the effects of community engagement on student achievement were not always 
positive for minority students. Instead, Hero (2003) found that while the overall rates of 
minority graduation improved as social capital increased, “the gap in graduation rates for 
minorities and whites [was also] greater in states with higher levels of social capital 
(117).” Measures of second-order discrimination also indicated that higher levels of 
social capital were related to an increase in the gap between whites and minority student 
suspension rates and an overall increase in the rate of minority students suspended 
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(Hawes and Rocha 2011). Therefore, in order to address the gaps in achievement 
between racial groups, social capital and the beneficial networks provided by local 
communities should be discussed.  
To properly understand the effect of social capital on education achievement across 
racial groups, it requires a look into community engagement at the local level and a 
measure of social capital that is race specific within communities. With the use of a 
novel dataset that measures social capital by race for the largest school districts, this 
research can analyze the influence of representation when interacted with minority 
community engagement.  
The influence of social capital or community networks for minority students should 
positively influence the relationship between same-race teachers and students. When 
same-race community members who are engaged in the community supplement the 
influence of same-race teachers and students (Dee 2005), same-race teachers behave in 
the workplace as members of a tightly bonded community and are likely to promote the 
interests of same-race students. Results indicate that strong community ties within the 
African-American community should further improve the positive effects of minority 
teachers on student performance. However, the results appear inconclusive for Latino 
bureaucratic representation.  
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Political Context 
In the final empirical chapter, I explore a third element of context that is often left 
out of the education discussion: politics. As local public goods that are managed by 
elected officials it is odd, to say the least, that public education fails to look at 
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partisanship and broader themes of political control. Because the majority of school 
districts conduct nonpartisan elections, schools are assumed to also be nonpartisan 
institutions. Yet, it would be naïve to think that school board members and local political 
interests create school policy without consideration of political ideology. Even more, 
recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) find that passive as well as active 
representation is highly influenced by partisanship within local districts. Their research 
illustrates that minority representation in school districts was less effective in Republican 
districts compared to Democratic districts, implying that active and/or passive 
representation and essentially bureaucratic processes are dependent on the political 
context of the school district. 
These findings promote the research question of my final chapter that asks how 
different political actors might influence representation. Representation is often thought 
of as a process that is approved by hierarchical political principals. But bureaucrats do 
not only operate in a context where support and bureaucratic actions are cued from the 
top-down. Instead, many bureaucratic organizations function from the bottom-up and 
make bureaucratic choices based on the support of political stakeholders like the public 
rather than elected officials.  
In public schools, it is likely that teachers are more effective at translating passive 
to active representation when there are elected officials who offer political support of 
their behaviors. Yet, education bureaucrats also engage with the public quite often. 
Drawing on the political control literature, this final chapter asks a broader political 
question. Is bureaucratic representation a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon? Because 
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the data observes bureaucracy at the local level, this research has the ability to capture 
public support as well as elected official support to compare the influence of both on 
representative behaviors and outcomes. The findings indicate that representation is a 
different process for different minority groups. While the marginal effect of African-
American bureaucrats is greatest when supported by the public, the marginal effect of 
Latino bureaucrats is greatest when supported by same-race elected officials. 
1.4 Case Selection: Why Education 
Although, the impact of bureaucratic representation has been applied across policy 
areas, this research specifically explores representation in the context of public education 
in the United States. The history of public education in the United States provides a 
unique context to study representation. Primarily its history is defined by a federally 
segregated school system that was not dismantled until the 1960s. This segregation 
created a policy program where achieving equal access and outcomes was essentially 
impossible. With a lack of resources diverted to minority jurisdictions, African-
American and Latino students performed far below their white peers. With the Brown v. 
Board decision in 1954, public schools began to slowly integrate. Yet, movement was 
entirely unidirectional as minority students moved into formerly all-white schools 
(Fairclough 2004) and minority teachers and administrators experienced a loss of 
employment in the public school system (Milner and Howard 2004).  
As schools needed to adjust to the influx of unprepared minority students, these 
schools were filled with educators who were often biased and prejudiced against the 
experiences of their minority students. Without representation or an advocate within the 
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new school system, minority students continued to perform well below their white peers 
academically. Meanwhile their representation among second generational education 
discrimination categories like special education and disciplinary programs began to grow 
(Skiba et al 2002). Therefore concerns of minority bureaucratic representation and 
inequitable student outcomes across racial groups are contemporary problems that have 
yet to be addressed.  
In addition, the United States’ public education system is a highly federalized system 
where schools are funded by formulas that depend largely on local property taxes1 and 
local lawmakers exhibit a large amount of discretion. Following Brown, the federal 
government has attempted to equalize funding across districts beginning with the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. This federal act was the first to use a 
formula based on each state’s number of low-income students as a basis for federal 
contributions (Manna 2013). Given that these new policies are implemented in a 
federalist system, research has consistently shown that once put in the hands of state and 
local officials, the monies intended for low-income students are redirected (Manna 
2013).  
The discussion of local inequities in funding due to uneven taxable wealth across 
districts has led to various lawsuits of state education finance systems. Since 1970, state 
education finance systems have been challenged in 36 states and 18 have been 
overturned (Wong 1999). While some state cases have positively ruled in favor of low-
                                                 
1 The base of school funding is provided by local property taxes. The additional state 
funding that helps to equalize funding differences does vary by state.  
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income or minority parents who are unequally taxed and whose students are unequally 
educated (i.e. Abbott v Burke 1985, Serrano v Priest 1971), other federal cases have 
ruled to preserve local control and have continued systems of funding inequities 
(Rodriguez v. San Antonio 1973). For the most part litigation has increased state aid to 
the poorest districts, but in states where reforms were initiated without litigation, funding 
reforms have been ineffective (Evans, Murray, and Schwab 1998).  Within the education 
finance literature many scholars (Ferguson 1991, Darling-Hammond 2000, Wong 1999) 
discuss the differences in funding as influential to student outcomes. As a result, schools 
vary widely. School communities and performance have now become a category 
considered in homeowner housing choices. As high-income individuals self-select into 
better school districts, the richest of schools only get richer as poor schools continue to 
decline.  
This perfect storm of historic federal segregation, continual funding disparities, and 
remnants of housing segregation have resulted in majority minority schools, with ill-
prepared teachers, minimal resources, and a poorly engaged school community. As 
same-race teachers are shown to improve same-race student test scores (Dee 2005, 
Egalite, Kisida, and Winters 2015), discipline rates (Lindsay and Hart 2017, Holt and 
Gershenson 2015), gifted and talented assignment (Grissom and Redding 2015, 
Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom et al 2016), and even future graduation rates (Gershenson et 
al 2017), the importance of minority teacher representation as a means to improve 
student outcomes is more important than ever. However, this need not only exists in the 
urban school context but also in suburban schools where racial majority teachers still fail 
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to address the needs of students of color who often feel isolated and struggle to perform 
in the face of institutional biases.  
Similar to the disparities witnessed in other institutions, the racial and gender biases 
within our public education system have produced unequal outcomes in educational 
achievement (Ladson-Billings 2006; Gershenson et al 2016). What is most striking about 
education however, is its endogenous relationship with every other social issue from 
political participation to economic wealth, housing, crime, etc (Lochner and Moretti 
2004; Hillygus 2005; Day and Newburger 2002). Addressing the gaps and racial biases 
that affect education has the potential to significantly improve overall life outcomes for 
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2. ACTIVE REPRESENTATION AND BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY 
 
Active representation or the act of working on behalf of specific client interests is a 
choice among bureaucrats. As rational individuals, there are a variety of subjective 
characteristics that may influence this decision (Carroll 2017, Wilkins and Williams 
2008). This chapter will theoretically explain how specific contexts potentially activate 
social identities that promote bureaucratic behaviors. Using the logic of rational choice 
political behavior, this chapter will outline how the subsequent empirical chapters fit this 
theory.  
Social identity theory describes that in making sense of the word around us, 
individuals order their social environment into categories or social groups such as age, 
race, organizational affiliation, class, etc. As a member of some social group, individuals 
develop a self-concept surrounding their social identity. Within each society these social 
categorizations define an individual’s place in society and individuals view the world 
through the lens of their social group (Tajfel 2010). 
Individuals, however, maintain multiple identities. Within identity and social 
movement politics, Crenshaw (1991) discusses intersectionality as the various ways 
identities interact to shape multiple dimensions of one’s experiences. In her work 
Crenshaw (1991) describes that discussions often revolve around an individual 
responding to one or the other identity. Yet, as individuals maintain multiple identities, 
the totality of these identities may be demonstrated in different behaviors not accounted 
for in previous one-dimensional approaches (Cho et al 2013). For instance public 
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bureaucrats maintain various identities. A teacher identifies as a public servant, an 
education professional, and with their specific school or school district. But these 
bureaucrats also maintain individual identities of class, race, region of origin, religious 
affiliation, sex, etc. As bureaucrats sort among these identities they may act upon one or 
the other. But often, one’s totality of identities intersects to influence their behaviors.  
Social identity theory informs us that when one’s self-concept is related to how the 
group is perceived, individuals may pursue behaviors in the best interest of their social 
group (Tajfel 2010). Representative bureaucracy illustrates this concept among public 
servants and explains that when individuals of various groups are represented within the 
bureaucracy, they will act on behalf of their social group and subsequently influence 
outcomes for that group (Meier 1993b, Mosher 1969). Bureaucrats, therefore, make 
decisions that are informed by their various social group memberships (Watkins-Hayes 
2011). The literature has demonstrated that when an identity becomes salient within a 
policy area, bureaucrats’ social identity can influence the outcomes of clients from the 
same social group.  
If we expect bureaucrats to pursue active representation, understanding which 
identities and how these identities will be activated is necessary for representation. When 
it comes to one’s organizational identity, Ashford and Mael (1989) explain that 
organizational socialization and the greater internalization of those values will influence 
one’s commitment to and support of their organization. Yet, where some identities 
conflict with that organizational commitment, bureaucratic behavior is not as clear 
(Watkins-Hayes 2009a, 2009b). In a study of representation, Wilkins and Williams 
  20 
(2008) demonstrate that racial minority police officers are not related to a decrease in 
racial profiling and attribute it to the strong socialization effects in the organization. 
Likewise, professional and individual goals of ambition are known to potentially conflict 
with bureaucratic behaviors that support racial identities (Carroll 2017). Therefore, when 
individuals maintain multiple identities, how will these identities intersect? When will 
some identities be activated while others are not? 
2.1 Rational Choices 
Rational choice theorists explain that political behaviors are motivated by individual 
goals that range from income and security to a bureaucrat’s desire to serve the public 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Downs 1967). Therefore, before engaging in political 
activity, both political and bureaucratic actors must weigh the individual costs and 
benefits of their behaviors. For public managers this has been demonstrated in research 
on career promotion where bureaucrats engage in increased networking behaviors with 
political actors if it will grant them promotion (Teodoro 2011). Bureaucrats will pursue 
behaviors that promote their individual goals but will also seek to attain less “whenever 
the cost of attaining any given [goal] rises…(Downs 1967, 2).” If the goal is pursuing 
active representation, bureaucrats will decide to take on the minority representative role 
when the costs are low.  
Borrowing from Black (1972), who introduces a rational choice model for political 
actors deciding to run for office, below is a formula that models individual political 
behavior. Essentially Black argues that a political actor’s choice to pursue office is not a 
stagnant characteristic but is structured by the experiences and current circumstances of 
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the actor. A political actor is expected to pursue behaviors that yield the greatest value. 
This formula explains that the value of the desired office will be determined after 
evaluating the probability of success, benefits of the behavior, and costs of action. The 
formula listed below describes that when the benefit times the probability of success is 
greater than the costs, the value of a political action will be great enough to promote 
action.  
((P*B)-C)= U 
P= Probability of Success 
B= The benefit the actor will receive from obtaining success 
C= The cost required to pursue action 
U= The expected value of utility of achieving one’s goal 
 
Fitting with theories of rational political ambition, bureaucrats will similarly make 
choices that maximize their values at the time. Because bureaucrats operate in an 
organizational context, their current context will influence their choices. If context 
introduces factors that increase the potential costs, decrease the benefits, or decrease the 
probability of success, active representation will be limited. 
2.2 Irrational Choices 
While the rational choice calculation is potentially structured by organizational 
context, it is an individual calculation that also depends on individual intrinsic factors. 
One intrinsic factor that may promote an irrational choice is the bureaucrat’s strength of 
identity. When minority individuals sense that individual chances are tied to their 
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minority group as a whole (Dawson 1995), they are likely to pursue actions in support of 
the group (Philpot and Walton 2007, Miller et al 1981). For the bureaucrat who 
maintains greater feelings of attachment to their minority group, the value of active 
representation may always be greater than the costs.  
A bureaucrat may also make irrational choices when they maintain an inherent risk 
aversion. Inherent risk aversion will increase the perceived costs of active representation 
even when the organizational costs are relatively low. Because bureaucratic norms 
attempt to depersonalize the bureaucrat (Downs 1967), acting in the interests of one 
group may be perceived as partiality in any bureaucratic organization. As a result, a risk 
adverse bureaucrat may fear that active representation is too costly for his current job or 
future goals. 
2.3 Rational Choice and Environmental Context 
Bureaucrats will look to their external and internal environments for cues that 
representation will be permissible, possible, and effective (Sowa and Seldon 2003). 
Bureaucrats essentially use these cues in their decision to act in the interests of minority 
groups. As contextual variables create changes in the level of organizational or 
bureaucratic support, the weight bureaucrats associate with the costs, benefits, and the 
probability of success of active representation may change.  
Context has the ability to influence active representation in two ways. First, the 
external context can potentially change internal organizational processes that will 
increase or decrease the costs of active representation making it more or less likely. In a 
time of accountability policies and performance measurement, public organizations are 
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motivated by goals of objective performance (Boyne et al 2005). When the external 
context potentially creates a threat to organizational performance, there are a variety of 
tools managers use to protect performance in the organization. Among these include the 
ability to centralize organizational activities by reorganizing resources, personnel, and 
goals (Boyne and Meier 2009). Throughout this centralization process the individual 
discretion that is often given to bureaucrats is potentially limited because each member 
within the agency is focused on similar goals and duties (Brewer and Walker 2009). As 
the external context changes the organizational culture and activities internally, 
bureaucratic action that goes against the core goals or activities of the organization is 
done at a greater risk. Therefore, the cost of behaviors like active representation is 
potentially increased. When the cost of acting on one’s personal identities can potentially 
threaten bureaucratic values such as employee performance, organizational sanctioning, 
and/or professional status, active representation in favor of organizational/professional 
commitment is more likely.  
Where an organization’s external context provides increased support, however, the 
costs of acting on one’s personal identity decreases and the likelihood of success in 
improving client outcomes will increase. Therefore, external context can additionally 
influence bureaucratic behaviors by changing the impact of their behavior on 
performance. Across policy areas, successful bureaucracies are often located within 
externally wealthy and supportive jurisdictions  (Andrews 2009). Within these 
organizations bureaucracy can achieve higher levels of performance not only because 
there are more opportunities for bureaucratic action and autonomy but also because 
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bureaucrats potentially receive the assistance of their clientele. Important processes of 
collaboration and coproduction are also more likely in environments with active 
participants (Brudney and England 1983).  
In addition, where there is political, organizational, or community support the 
probability of success may also improve as these political actors contribute to 
bureaucratic efforts of active representation. For instance, bureaucratic representation is 
known to spur performance because representation can promote a role model effect 
among clients encouraging a change in client behaviors (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 
2006). Where clients and additional political actors are working toward similar goals of 
minority client performance, the behaviors of those within the organizational 
environment can supplement the efforts of bureaucrats. When the environment 
surrounding an organization provides support or resources that are beneficial to 
bureaucratic efficiency, the probability of success of bureaucratic behaviors like active 
representation increases. As a result the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on client 
outcomes will change. This second theoretical mechanism falls in line with the public 
management literature, which expects that the impact of management on performance 
will change in different contexts (O’Toole and Meier 2014).  
In Figure 1, I present an illustration of how contextual variables interact with 
organizational processes to influence bureaucratic behaviors. First, by providing a 
variation of stress, resources, and/or support, context changes organizational processes. 
Within the organization, management appropriately responds through processes of 
centralization, co-production, and changes in organizational goals. As bureaucrats 
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receive cues directly from their environment or from their organization’s response to that 
environment, they will then weigh the costs, benefits, and potential success of active 
representation as their actions are now potentially limited or encouraged within their 
organization. A bureaucrat’s decision to act or the impact of those actions will result in 
various client outcomes. This research specifically contributes the importance of 
environmental context within the bureaucratic representation process. The decision to act 
on behalf of clients cannot be separated from the changes the organization creates in 
response to the external context.  
 
Figure 1: How Context Interacts with Active Representation 
 
This rational choice approach to active representation has multiple repercussions for 
organizational performance and minority client outcomes. Primarily, similar to the ways 
in which environmental contexts matter for bureaucratic representation, various other 
identities or contexts can operate within this process. For instance, internal 
organizational contexts such as goal ambiguity and professionalization may also affect 
this rational choice calculus. Their agency to choose actions on behalf of their identity 
group will vary depending on the risks and costs introduced in these various contexts.  
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In addition, representative bureaucracy is an essential technique used to combat 
performance gaps across public organizations. But, understanding how context prevents 
active representation suggests that some public organizations are responding in a manner 
that prevents an administrative technique that we know will influence client outcomes. 
The remainder of this research hopes to empirically address the effect of context and 
indicate how it actually plays a larger role in management and bureaucratic decision-
making than we have previously thought.  
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3. MO’ MONEY, NO PROBLEM: THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STRESS ON 
REPRESENTATION 
 
Across public schools, health care providers, and welfare services, representative 
bureaucracies are understood to improve performance. From the impact of representation 
on client perceptions of trust and fairness (Ricucci et al 2014, Theobald and Haider-
Markel 2009) to improvement in objective performance across groups (Meier 1993a, 
Meier and O’Toole 2006b, Andrews et al 2014, Wilkins 2007), racial minority and 
gender representation is expected to produce positive outcomes in public organizations. 
However, no organization or the behaviors of its bureaucrats can be viewed separate 
from the organization’s context (O’Toole and Meier 2014). Because the organizational 
context outlines the structure, autonomy, and resources of the bureaucracy, this context 
becomes fundamental in determining bureaucratic behaviors. And it may be the case that 
these same aspects of context will hinder or promote bureaucratic behaviors such as, 
active representation. In the setting of United States public education, this research will 
explore one aspect of context by analyzing how an organization’s access to different 
financial resources will affect bureaucratic representation.  
A constant source of stress for many public organizations originates from the 
uncertain and low resource environments in which they operate. These resources can 
range from participatory client groups, to quality support networks, and most 
importantly funding. But in a world where accountability policies have run rampant and 
the degree of future funding is now dependent on organizational performance, many 
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local service providers find themselves in environments that are everything but resource 
rich.  
In the context of this research resources are often a concern as many minority 
students attend public schools in districts where through local tax revenue there are not 
sufficient funds available to manage their schools. Even with the assistance of state and 
federal revenue sources, students are attending local schools that struggle to hire 
teachers, keep supplies in the classroom, or purchase technology for student use. These 
issues result in bureaucratic and performance inequalities where Black students are 
expelled at three times the rate of white students and Black and Latino students only 
account for 26 percent of gifted and talented students (U.S. Department of Education 
Office for Civil Rights 2014).   
Scholars have argued that one method to improve minority performance and address 
inequalities across public programs is to increase racial representation among 
bureaucrats, administrators, and elected officials (Grissom et al 2015). But, I would 
argue that even the most representative organizations require sufficient resources to 
achieve performance.  The interesting question then becomes, how will resources or the 
lack thereof affect our current understanding of representation? When the racial 
congruence between minority teachers and students is expected to produce greater 
minority achievement (Oates 2003, Dee 2004, Dee 2005), how will this relationship 
change in low resource environments? Even more, are resources more beneficial for 
representation when allocated toward certain tasks in the organization?  
  29 
To answer these questions, this research will first present an overview of 
representative bureaucracy and describe environmental context as a potential threat to 
representation. Next, I will explain the processes through which I expect resources to 
affect active representation. And finally, I will empirically test the impact of specific 
resources on representation. As the gap between minority and white student achievement 
continues to grow in the United States, this research will demonstrate that maintaining 
methods to improve performance through diversity and resource management is crucial 
to future student success.  
2.1 Representative Bureaucracy 
Successful representation where the presence or actions of minorities in the 
bureaucracy translates into gains for minority clients has been demonstrated in multiple 
public agencies (Selden 1997, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Representation is 
known to influence outcomes that may specifically benefit a minority group. For 
instance Wilkins and Keiser (2006) find that female representation among supervisors in 
Child Support Enforcement offices resulted in an increase in child support collections 
for female recipients. Most often cited in research, however, is the affect of bureaucratic 
representation on overall measures of organizational performance; this includes 
perceived job performance (Riccucci et al 2014), client satisfaction (Gade and Wilkins 
2013), objective performance scores in education (Grissom et al 2015), and performance 
rates in public health (Zhu and Walker 2013). 
In each case of successful representation three conditions are present. First, there is a 
shared identity and group socialization between the bureaucrat and client. When a public 
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agent shares an identity with the client, scholars assume that similar socialization 
patterns results in shared interests that ultimately encourage a bureaucrat to act on behalf 
of his/her group (Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981).  This degree of in-group socialization 
or connection with one’s identity group, however, is not always guaranteed. In some 
agencies, such as police departments, the influence of in-group socialization is 
overwhelmed by the socialization that occurs within the agency. Where organizational or 
professional socialization strongly determines bureaucratic behavior, the organization’s 
socialization process can threaten or overwhelm individual socialization effects and 
mitigate the effect of minority representatives in the bureaucracy (Wilkins and Williams 
2008, 2009).  A similar process was surprisingly uncovered in Georgia public schools 
where the socialization processes in charter schools lead to a decline in the effects of 
representation in charter schools compared to traditional public schools (Roch and Pitts 
2012). 
Second, successful representation is present when the identity of the bureaucrat is 
salient within the policy area (Meier 1993b). Identity salience is clearly exemplified in 
research on gender representation, where the impact of women in the classroom is 
positive for female student math scores (Keiser et al 2002). Because females experience 
a gap in achievement in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and math 
(Mangan 2012), female math teachers are expected to be beneficial in a way that female 
English teachers are not.  
The significance of identity salience for racial minorities has also been noted when 
bureaucrats operate in public sectors characterized by historical or contemporary racial 
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discrimination. In a national study of representation in public schools, Grissom et al 
(2009) explore the priming effects of region and find that in the southern United States, 
where race is more salient and outcomes across racial groups are more severe, the 
agency’s regional context will influence bureaucratic representation. Black teachers in 
the south can then produce greater benefits for Black students because their racial 
identity is more salient in that regional context and Black student performance is 
disproportionately lower.   
The final necessary condition for successful representation is the presence of 
significant discretion in the organization.  Sowa and Selden (2003) explore the 
importance of discretion finding that where there is little perceived discretion, minority 
representatives are less likely to take on the trustee role in the organization. Similarly, in 
welfare service delivery, Watkins-Hayes (2011) finds that formalized red tape and strict 
procedures inhibit any perception of a personalized bureaucrat/client interaction. For 
minority clients, having a same-race caseworker is not influential when jobs are so 
formalized that all discretion is squeezed out of the organization.  
For various reasons, additional contexts have also been known to influence 
representation. Most interesting among these is how partisan context can create stark 
differences in the representation effects across school districts. Meier and Rutherford 
(2016) explore this relationship and find that compared to Republican districts, African-
American teachers are more effective in improving student performance in Democratic 
districts. This difference in representation has substantive overall effects, as students are 
26 percent less likely to be suspended and 33 percent less likely to be expelled in 
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Democratic school districts. Although, this study looked solely at political context, the 
environmental context may be equally critical for successful representation. 
2.1 Environmental Context and Public Management 
Environmental context describes the external context of the organization. When first 
described by organizational theorists, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) explain that 
successful organizations are oriented toward their environment as its demands create 
pressures for both the structure and operations of the organization. As such, the 
environmental context can either provide positive or negative, uncontrollable 
circumstances that must be addressed by the organization. Dess and Beard (1984) 
explain later three dimensions of organizational environments to include munificence, 
complexity, and dynamism. Low economic munificence describes organizations that 
suffer from low economic resources. Because prosperous organizations can provide a 
variety of discretionary services and invest in improving their effectiveness, researchers 
(Andrews and Boyne 2008) hypothesize that economic munificence is negatively related 
to organizational failure. When organizations work without economic restriction, the 
additional resources help organizations generate slack. For those organizations that are 
financially impoverished, good management is then expected to protect the core 
activities of the organization and maintain performance. The second dimension of task 
environment includes the level of complexity or diversity of the organization’s client 
population. In most public organizations, complexity has been known to threaten overall 
levels of performance because agents must learn to address the needs of various client 
groups (Andrews et al 2005). However, organizations that invest in representation 
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among managers are often able to address the difficulties presented by client complexity 
(Pitts 2007). Dynamism, the final dimension of task difficulty, describes shocks to the 
organization or the change and frequency of shifts in both munificence and complexity. 
It is expected that if an organization wishes to maintain performance but is operating in 
an environment of high dynamism, they are likely to have formulated techniques that 
adjust to continuous shocks (O’Toole and Meier 2010). 
These external constraints are known to influence a wide variety of internal 
organizational outcomes.  For instance, economic munificence and turbulence has been 
related to a decrease in objective organizational performance (Andrews et al 2005, 
Boyne and Meier 2009b). By first attacking internal processes, economic munificence 
can negatively affect organizational efficiency and performance. In addition, Boyne and 
Meier (2009a) found that high economic munificence created a favorable task 
environment and decreased turnaround. Aware of the pressures created by the 
environment, managers’ subjective evaluations of their environment were also related to 
organizational performance (Andrews 2009).  A public manager’s best defense against 
the environment is then to create a buffer. Organizations with prepared techniques are 
then able to serve clients without environmental changes affecting overall performance 
(Meier et al 2010). In cases where organizations face environments defined by low fiscal 
resources or unexpected budgetary shocks, successful management practices include 
maintaining a significant level of managerial capacity, managing personnel, and 
allocating resources to core organizational performance.  
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Managerial capacity and stability provides a level of slack resources that allow 
public organizations to create a buffer when faced with budgetary declines (Boyne and 
Meier 2009b).  Budgetary shocks then have no effect on performance because capacity 
mitigates the shock (O’Toole and Meier 2010). Similarly, managing personnel is 
beneficial for organizations such as, school districts where teachers are hired on annual 
contracts. Unexpected shocks to the district’s budget then allow superintendents to not 
offer contract extensions and effectively decrease the average amount spent on personnel 
salaries (Meier and O’Toole 2009). Finally managers are known to address stressed 
financial environments by reallocating resources away from periphery activities and 
toward areas that address the organization’s primary goals (Meier and O’Toole 2009).  
While successful at promoting core organizational activities, these buffering 
activities can take away from periphery activities that may be outside of the defined 
tasks of bureaucracy. For instance, when schools cut the hiring of teacher’s aides and 
increase class sizes, teachers may no longer maintain the ability to provide extra 
assistance to students. Instead, they are faced with larger concerns of managing an 
overcrowded classroom. Therefore, the implementation of techniques used to protect 
performance can often disturb unseen, internal processes or behaviors in the 
organization. In organizations where active representation may require additional 
resources and is not accounted for in the organization’s core performance, active 
representation may be limited. 
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2.2  Theory and Hypotheses 
While the representative bureaucracy literature makes clear assumptions describing 
where active representation is likely, this literature often fails to include a discussion of 
how changes to external features of the organization will potentially influence the link 
from passive to active representation. I expect that as rational bureaucrats, the decision 
to act on behalf of minority clients will be more likely where there is little risk in 
demonstrating representative behaviors and there is increased ability through discretion 
to pursue such behaviors. The impact of these behaviors on performance is also greater 
when bureaucrats of greater quality perform them. Therefore, as turbulence in the 
external context potentially influences internal processes of centralization, decreases 
bureaucratic quality, and/or eliminates bureaucratic assistance in the organization, the 
decision of bureaucrats to act of behalf of clients and the impact of bureaucratic 
behaviors on performance may decrease.  
Like many school districts across the United States, cuts in federal and state funding 
have become an unfortunate reality. In 2013, Hickory and Catawaba county school 
districts in North Carolina expected a loss of more than $120 million in state funding 
(Flannick 2013). When asked how the districts would address the cuts, superintendents 
responded that cuts would affect the hiring of teachers’ aides, counselors, and decrease 
support for special education programs, English-language programs, and staff 
professional development. This example demonstrates a process where a lack of funding 
caused managers to make decisions that eliminated activities in the bureaucracy. In the 
case of education, this often manifests in real-time resources that are taken out of 
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schools. For instance, the size of gifted and talented programming may decrease as well 
as the resources spent on advertising such programs to all students in order to guarantee 
equal access.  
I would argue, however, that it is not only activities but also bureaucratic behaviors 
that are eliminated based on the organization’s financial climate. Because poor resources 
will negatively influence performance in most agencies (Boyne and Meier 2009b), the 
agency can mitigate negative environmental stress by strengthening internal structural 
stability (Meier and O’Toole 2009). Organizations placed in stressed environments 
follow a process of centralization in order to focus on and guarantee certain outcomes. 
As good organizations readjust activities, personnel, and resources to create some level 
of internal stability (Meier and O’Toole 2009), increased rules and structures are 
introduced that will limit the behaviors of bureaucrats.  
Although fiscal stress will create an intentional centralization process, in an attempt 
to focus the goals of the organization and maintain performance this centralization 
process will effectively decrease bureaucratic discretion. When the organization’s 
environment can threaten the discretion allocated to bureaucrats and disrupt the process 
that translates passive to active representation, active representation is all but erased in 
the bureaucracy. For the minority bureaucrat, a low resource environment is expected to 
minimize discretion and decrease the ability of minority agents to act in the interests of 
minority clients. Where resources are rich, the exact opposite is expected to be true. 
Instead, bureaucrats operating in schools with a greater amount of financial resources 
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will maintain higher levels of discretion and their ability to be an active representative 
will be greater.  
Given the significant role of teachers in both academic placement and discipline I 
expect funding to influence active representation in the education context. As school 
districts experience a decline in funding, bureaucratic and organizational activities may 
fall across the board. This change implies a decline in bureaucratic procedures such as, 
teacher communication with clients and organizational investment in discipline 
intervention for teachers. All of which will inevitably amplify the burden of minority 
teachers to be a point person for academic and disciplinary referrals. But representation 
without resources will make it increasingly difficult to achieve positive outcomes. The 
hypothesis then follows that: H1: As total funding increases, minority teacher 
representation will positively influence minority student achievement.  
Nonetheless, some resources may prove more beneficial than others when they 
create slack in the organization. Recently, Westerville City School District in Franklin, 
Ohio was fortunate enough to receive additional funding in the form of a Lead Higher 
Initiative grant (Willis 2015) that will allocate an additional $25,000 to each high school 
in the district. Although the additional resources seem like very little, this funding is 
exactly what is needed to hire temporary consultants to help identify low-income and 
minority students for placement in Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate 
programs. In Westerville School District, these resources exemplify the financial and 
administrative slack that allows teachers to pursue innovative actions or take action on 
behalf of minority students. In resource environments that maintain a greater level of 
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slack, the presence of minority teachers can have an even greater effect on minority 
student performance.    
While there is debate regarding whether or not funding alone is beneficial to student 
achievement (Hanushek 1997, Darling-Hammond 2004), the education literature does 
maintain one camp of scholars convinced that money matters when allocated toward the 
proper tasks. Slavin (1999) and Darling-Hammond (2004) discuss the importance of 
funding when used to improve education practices or quality teaching. When resources 
are invested in the ongoing professional development of teachers or the implementation 
of programs intended to support or reach students in less traditional ways, funding is 
expected to improve performance.  
Most importantly, when financial resources are invested within the bureaucracy, this 
not only influences teacher development but also, can affect the quality of teachers hired 
by the district. Quality bureaucrats, measured by bureaucratic salary residuals, are then 
expected to improve performance in the organization (Meier and O’Toole 2002). When 
slack resources allow an investment in the hiring of quality minority teachers, these 
minority bureaucrats can be more effective for student performance.  
Resource rich environments then allow schools to hire better teachers, invest in the 
development of teachers already employed, or provide assistance where needed. These 
resources can also provide bureaucrats with better skills including classroom 
management practices, gifted student identification training, and the assistance of 
education consultation firms. For minority teachers who are often faced with the 
pressure to connect with students of color and identify with them, the resources that 
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provide slack or needed assistance to better perform bureaucratic activities may help 
alleviate the burdens of faculty. I expect the relationship between minority teachers to 
have a positive and larger impact on minority student outcomes than overall 
organizational resources. The second hypothesis follows that: H2: As funding for 
instruction increases, minority teacher representation will have a greater impact on 
minority student achievement. 
2.3 Methods and Data 
This research will model the influence of funding on representation in the context of 
primary and secondary education. Using a national sample of the largest United States 
school districts in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012, the analysis will first model student 
outcomes as a function of representation, resources, and organizational/community 
characteristics. Next, I will add an interaction of teacher representation and funding to 
determine if representation is more or less effective for student outcomes at various 
levels of district resources. To analyze these relationships I will use OLS models with 
time fixed effects to control for the changes that occur across districts in different years.  
I also control for the district level effects and potential correlation between districts by 
clustering the standard errors at the district level. The unit of analysis in these models 
will be school districts across the United States. After pooling data from multiple 
sources across years, these analyses include approximately 3,000 individual cases.1 
                                                 
1 Additional models were used to test the robustness of these findings. In the 
supplementary appendix, the results of linear regression interaction models with time 
fixed-effects and district fixed effects are listed. These models test the effects of funding 
changes on teacher representation within a district. 
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2.3.1 Dependent Variables of Interest  
The dependent variable of interest is student outcomes across different racial groups. 
The representation literature often cites the influence of teacher representation on 
performance (Grissom et al 2015, Egalite et al 2015). Within education ideal measures 
for student performances include standardize test results, graduation rates, discipline 
rates, and additional educational programing. Because this is a national sample I have 
chosen two measures of performance that are both objective and comparable across 
districts: racial composition of gifted and talented classrooms in the district and the 
racial composition of students experiencing school discipline. Using these two variables 
will allow me to capture the influence of representation across high and low achievement 
indicators. Both variables were collected from the Office for Civil Rights, which records 
data on student class placement, special education programs, discipline outcomes, and a 
variety of other student outcomes by race at the district level. 
I operationalized these performance variables by the percentage of gifted and 
talented students that are Black and Latino. To create these variables, I created a 
percentage by dividing the aggregate number of Black students in gifted and talented 
programs by the total number of students in the gifted and talented program and 
multiplying by 100. I completed the same process for Latino students in gifted and 
talented classrooms. To measure student expulsions by race, I also created a variable 
measuring the percentage of student expulsions that included Black and Latino students.2 
                                                 
2 Student outcomes can be operationalized various ways. Based on previous research 
(Keiser et al 2002, Meier and Rutherford 2016), I have chosen to operationalize the 
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Although there is some debate that teachers maintain little control over these 
outcomes specifically in districts where gifted and talented placement is determined by 
student exams and discipline decisions are made at the administrative level, both of these 
policies vary nationally. The state boards of education set vague standards for gifted 
programs, which often include topics such as student identification practices, instruction, 
and professional development qualifications. However, as districts implement these 
programs with increasing discretion, states often fail to hold districts accountable to the 
standards meant to guarantee performance, accessibility, and high quality. The National 
Association for Gifted Children identified through surveys completed in 2014 that more 
than 50% of the school districts surveyed reported that there was no program evaluation 
or plans to monitor the gifted programs. Likewise only 54 percent of elementary, 39 
percent of middle, and 28 percent of high school level programs used National Gifted 
Education Programming Standards to guide programming (Callahan et al 2014). This 
varying discretion and lack of accountability creates major concerns for equal 
accessibility.  
Because of the widening disparities between racial minority and white students, 
student identification practices are also a source of concern. For years, researchers 
(English 2002) have voiced concern that in some districts’ gifted and talented students 
are selected based on their performance on the IOWA basic skills exams or IQ tests. 
                                                                                                                                                
dependent variable of performance by the percentage of minority students in high-
achievement and low-achievement performance tracks. The under and over-
representation of minority students in these two groups respectively are often cited 
within the education literature using percentages. However, potential measures of the 
impact of representation on performance could also be the use of a ratio measure. 
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These methods of standardized testing alone are known to discriminate against 
disadvantaged and minority students and do not assess the true abilities and potential of 
students (Hilliard III 1976). As a result, although some districts still identify students 
based on one examination performance, many attempt to identify underrepresented 
students using multiple sources such as, student portfolios, student interviews, anecdotal 
notes, and teacher observations (Callahan et al 2014). The influence of teacher referrals 
becomes increasingly important for minority students. For low-income or disadvantaged 
students whose parents are unaware of gifted programming and do not request that their 
child is tested for these programs, teacher referrals can be the sole way of identifying 
students. Minority teachers can then have a significant role as a representative by 
increasing access to the initial assessment for these exams (Nicholson-Crotty et al 2016). 
Nonetheless, even across states, teacher preparation in order to properly educate or 
identify gifted and talented students is questionable as only 54 percent of elementary, 49 
percent of middle, and 34 percent of high school level programs required that teachers 
receive a state certification in gifted education (Callahan et al 2014). 
In addition, because discipline concerns originate in the classroom and policies are 
often at the discretion of the school, teachers play a large role in the initial identification 
of students deserving of discipline. Administrators are less likely to expel students with 
fewer discipline violations and teachers are the whistle-blowers for discipline violations 
that occur in their classrooms. When schools are provided with additional resources, 
funding can be invested in effective discipline alternatives such as behavioral 
management programs. Discipline alternatives can potentially provide teachers with time 
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to assess the social, emotional, and behavioral needs of the student before administrative 
involvement (Christle et al 2005, Bradshaw et al 2009). As co-minority group members, 
minority teachers’ cultural congruence affects their perception of student behavior and 
potential achievement. When resources are available that promotes alternative discipline, 
minority teachers will likely be more favorable to these methods than administrative 
methods of suspension and expulsion (Lindsay and Hart 2017).  
2.3.2 Independent Variables of Interest  
The first independent variable of interest is teacher representation. This variable was 
collected as a part of the Project for Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG) 
National School Survey distributed to school districts with more than 5,000 students as 
of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). These surveys were distributed by mail in 2002, 
2004, 2008, and 2012. Of the 5,493 districts, the survey had a response rate of 94.5 
percent. This survey collected data on the racial representation of public school districts’ 
teachers, administration, and elected school board members. For minority teacher 
representation, I include separate measures of the percentage of Black and Latino 
teachers in the district.  
The second variable of interest is changes in funding. All funding measures were 
gathered from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of 
Data. To analyze hypothesis one, the change in overall resources is operationalized by 
total revenue per pupil received by the school district. Total revenue includes the local, 
state, and federal revenue. To analyze hypothesis two, I will operationalize funding 
invested in the bureaucracy with a measure of the change in total instructional 
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expenditures in the district. The total instructional expenditures best exemplify resources 
allocated to the bureaucracy by including payments to teachers for “salaries, benefits, 
supplies, material, and contractual service for elementary/secondary instruction…” In 
addition, these expenditures cover programs offered during the regular school year and 
summer school. Last, these expenditures can be used on the hiring of teachers, teacher’s 
aides, and assistants.  
For both total revenue and instructional expenditures, I divided the total funding 
amount by the public school enrollment in the district and logged the variable to account 
for skewed data. To create a variable of change in resources or financial stress, I have 
used similar methods as that of Boyne and Meier (2009b). I regress the previous years 
resources on the current year, after logging the variable. I then predict the residuals, 
which account for the percent change. 
2.3.3 Control Variables  
In addition to teacher representation and funding, I will control for a variety of 
organizational and community characteristics that are expected to influence student 
performance. Because policy is often decided at the administrative level, I have also 
included variables that capture the amount of minority representation present among 
administration. Administrative representation is measured by the percent of Latino and 
Black administrators in the district in each year. These data were gathered as a part of 
the PERG National School Survey.  
I also expect the student population or organizational clientele to influence the 
outcomes of minority students. With respect to the racial group of interest in each model, 
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I have controlled for the percentage of Latino and Black students in the district. I have 
also included a measure of the total enrollment in the district. This variable is 
operationalized by the total number of students in the district and logged.3 
The final organizational characteristic included as a control variable is the program 
size. In some districts the implementation of certain policies (i.e. zero-tolerance) have 
created an environment where certain outcomes are more likely (Evenson et al 2009). I 
expect that where the gifted and talented programs are larger and the rate of total 
expulsion is greater, the outcomes for minority students will be greater as well. To 
operationalize this variable, in models that predict gifted and talented, I control for the 
percentage of students in the district that are in gifted and talented programs. When the 
outcome variable is expulsion of minority students, the program size variable is 
operationalized by the percentage of total students in the district that are expelled.  
Although, variables at the organizational level will certainly influence student 
performance, there is truth in the saying, “It takes a village to raise a child.” For this 
reason, I have also included a variety of district characteristics that are known to 
influence student outcomes. First, parental education and income are two of the most 
consistent predictors of student performance (Desimone 1999). Because this analysis 
does not observe education and income at the individual level, I have gathered U.S. 
Census data on the education and income of minority groups within the school district. 
                                                 
3 Additional organizational variables such as, teacher quality, teacher experience, 
student/teacher ratio, and central administrative size may be influential to the dependent 
variable and relationship in question. However, because the data originate from a 
national survey taken at different points in time, proxies such as, community 
characteristics, revenue, and enrollment are used instead. 
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To control for education, I will use the percentage of Black and Latino individuals in the 
school district with a college degree or greater. To control for income, I use the average 
income for Black and Latino families in the district.  
Last, I will control for the partisanship of the school district. While many would 
argue that school districts are nonpartisan given the nonpartisan nature of most school 
board elections, recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) find otherwise. Instead, 
in Republican school districts African-American students are more likely to have poorer 
results across performance outcomes including gifted and talented placement, 
suspensions, expulsions, and standardized test achievement. To control for partisanship I 
will use the same measure employed by Meier and Rutherford (2014) to measure the 
average percentage of individuals in the school district that voted for President Obama in 
2004 and 2008.4 
2.4  Findings 
Beginning with a base model that controls for representation and district resources 
independently, an analysis of student gifted and talented outcomes indicates that Black 
and Latino teachers have an independent and positive impact on minority student 
performance (see table 1 and table 2). On average, a 10 percent increase in Black or 
Latino teachers can increase the percentage of Black students in gifted and talented 
programs by approximately 2.8 percent and Latino students by 3.7 percent.  These 
findings are consistent across the different types of funding and minority group 
outcomes and are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  
                                                 
4 This variable does not vary across the different time-series in the data. 
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Independently, the organization's financial resources have different effects across 
minority groups. For Black students, an increase in total revenue from the previous year 
does not significantly affect the Black gifted and talented students in the district. Yet, for 
Latino students, an increase in total revenue is related to a statistically significant 
increase in performance. However, resources allocated to instructional expenditures have 
different effects on Black and Latino students. Instructional expenditures can 
significantly decrease on Black gifted and talented students, but has an insignificant 
effect on Latino gifted and talented.  
Table 1. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black Gifted 
and Talented 
 Black G/T Black 
G/T 
Black G/T Black G/T 
Black Teachers 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.273*** 0.392*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0638) (0.069) (0.072) 
Total Revenue (TR) 0.528 0.516 - - 
 (0.294) (0.286)   
Black Teachers x TR - 0.101*** - - 
  (0.0259)   
Instructional 
Expenditures (IE) 
- - -2.386* -3.587** 
   (1.172) (1.097) 
Black Teachers x IE - - 0.284*** 
    -0.06 
Black Administrators -0.00268 -0.0317 0.001 -0.021 
 (0.0536) (0.0531) (0.053) (0.052) 
Black students 0.499*** 0.489*** 0.505*** 0.469*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0334) (0.034) (0.033) 
Black College Grads -0.00004 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
 -0.0099 -0.0095 (0.0103) (0.0097) 
Black Income 1.182** 1.369*** 1.166** 1.129** 
 (0.377) (0.367) (0.367) (0.351) 
Total Enrollment -0.659* -0.553* -0.742* -0.738* 
 (0.29) (0.281) (0.301) (0.289) 
Democrat Voting 0.0721*** 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.083*** 
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Table 1. Continued from previous page 
 Black G/T Black 
G/T 
Black G/T Black G/T 
 (0.016) (0.0157) (0.0161) (0.015) 
G/T Program Size 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.116*** 0.106*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
2008 0.191 0.895 2.004 0.973 




 (0.958) (0.952) (1.152) (1.169) 
Constant -11.21** -13.34** -12.76** -11.46** 
 (4.32) (4.158) (4.097) (3.948) 
N 2273 2273 2275 2275 
R2 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78 
District Fixed Effects not reported    
Standard Errors reported below coefficient    
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001    
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Table 2. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino G/T 
 Latino G/T Latino G/T Latino G/T Latino G/T 
Latino Teachers 0.376*** 0.406*** 0.367*** 0.373*** 
 (0.0912) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) 
Total Revenue 1.138*** 1.170*** - - 
 (0.316) (0.317)   
Latino Teachers x Total 
Revenue 
- -0.035 - - 
  (0.0204)   
Instructional Expenditures 
(IE) 
- - -2.136 -2.574* 
   (1.263) (1.251) 
Latino Teachers x IE - - - 0.103* 
    (0.052) 
Latino Administrators 0.0647 0.0662 0.0679 0.0765 
 (0.0663) (0.0661) (0.0671) (0.067) 
Latino Students 0.560*** 0.554*** 0.564*** 0.563*** 
 (0.034) (0.0343) (0.034) (0.034) 
Latino College Grads 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.0597*** 0.061*** 
 (0.0152) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Latino Income -0.834 -0.855 -1.368** -1.447** 
 (0.495) (0.492) (0.526) (0.529) 
Total Enrollment 0.25 0.268 0.21 0.201 
 (0.263) (0.267) (0.269) (0.267) 
Democrat Voting -0.0324 -0.0327 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
G/T Program Size 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0286) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
2008 1.232* 1.062* 2.309 2.084 
 (0.495) (0.476) (1.256) (1.276) 
2012 -0.142 0.177 4.536*** 4.552*** 
 (0.975) (0.965) (1.193) (1.194) 
Constant 2.026 1.999 4.584 5.386 
 (4.869) (4.871) (5.312) (5.33) 
N 2256 2256 2258 2258 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
District Fixed Effects not reported    
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
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Although representation does have a positive effect on the high achievement 
performance measure, tables 3 and 4 indicates that the independent effect of minority 
teachers is not present when predicting low performance student outcomes. Across 
models predicting minority student expulsions, on average the presence of minority 
teachers does not have a statistically significant effect on the percent of expulsions 
experienced by minority students.  
Instead, funding plays a more significant role in determining low performance 
indicators like Black and Latino student expulsions. For Latino students, a 1 percent 
positive change in total revenue decreases Latino expulsions by 4 percent. This variable 
is significant at the 0.001 level. In addition, instructional expenditures will have an even 
greater effect on Latino student expulsions. Effectively a 1 percent positive change in 
instructional expenditures will decrease Latino student expulsions by approximately 8 
percent. These effects are significant at the 0.001 level.  
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Table 3. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black Student 
Expulsions 
 Black Exp. Black Exp. Black Exp. Black Exp. 
Black Teachers -0.0065 -0.0054 -0.0185 -0.241* 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.115) 
Total Revenue -2.326** -2.332** - - 
 (0.816) (0.815)   
Black Teachers x Total 
Revenue 
- 0.0299 - - 
  (0.056)   
Instructional 
Expenditures (IE) 
- - -2.815 -0.623 
   (2.535) (2.488) 
Black Teachers x IE - - - -0.528*** 
    (0.109) 
Black Administrators -0.009 -0.0171 -0.01 0.031 
 (0.1) (0.099) (0.1) (0.096) 
Black Students 0.810*** 0.807*** 0.803*** 0.870*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Black College Grads 0.0004 0.0008 0.029 0.0249 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) -0.0309 
Black Income -2.614* 2.558* -2.052* -1.977* 
 (1.015) (1.011) (0.995) (0.978) 
Total Enrollment 3.263*** 3.297*** 3.131*** 3.142*** 
 (0.687) (0.685) (0.712) (0.7) 
Democrat Voting -0.067 -0.069 -0.063 -0.0447 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) 
Total Expulsions 9.311*** 9.296*** 9.155*** 9.139*** 
 (1.456) (1.454) (1.454) (1.479) 
2008 -14.05*** -13.85*** -9.307*** -7.352** 
 (1.346) (1.359) (2.661) (2.606) 
2012 7.433** 7.029** 4.13 5.047 
 (2.583) (2.532) (2.67) (2.605) 
Constant 1.614 0.97 -3.716 -6.262 
 (10.91) (10.85) (10.56) (10.43) 
N 2273 2273 2275 2275 
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 
District Fixed Effects not reported    
Standard Errors reported below coefficient   
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001    
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Table 4. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino 
Student Expulsions 
 Latino Exp. Latino Exp. Latino Exp. Latino Exp. 
Latino Teachers -0.13 -0.123 -0.177 -0.177 
 (0.147) -0.156 -0.144 -0.144 
Total Revenue (TR) -4.316*** -4.307*** - - 
 (0.735) (0.737)   
Latino Teachers x 
TR 
- -0.008 - - 
  (0.049)   
Instructional 
Expenditures (IE) 
- - -8.367*** -8.367*** 
   (2.285) (2.285) 
Latino Teachers x IE - - - -0.585*** 
    (0.132) 
Latino 
Administrators 
0.236 0.237 0.172 0.172 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.135) (0.135) 
Latino Students 0.710*** 0.709*** 0.709*** 0.709*** 
 (0.046) -0.0475 (0.046) (0.046) 
Latino College 
Grads 
-0.045 (0.0452) -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Latino Income -1.936 -1.941 0.832 0.832 
 (1.048) (1.045) (1.046) (1.046) 
Total Enrollment 2.447*** 2.451*** 2.007*** 2.007*** 
 (0.579) (0.579) (0.57) (0.57) 
Democrat Voting -0.033 -0.033 0.012 0.012 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.0404) (0.040) 
Total Expulsions 4.683*** 4.682*** 4.015*** 4.015*** 
 (0.894) (0.893) (0.859) (0.859) 
2008 -13.78*** -13.82*** 1.439 1.439 
 (1.227) (1.194) (2.416) (2.416) 
2012 9.196*** 9.268*** 5.184* 5.184* 
 (2.531) (2.491) (2.256) (2.256) 
Constant -1.494 -1.502 -30.14** -30.14** 
 (10.23) (10.24) (11.00) (11.00) 
N 2256 2256 2258 2258 
R2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 
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Table 4. Continued from previous page 
  Latino Exp. Latino Exp. Latino Exp. Latino Exp. 
District Fixed Effects not reported 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Next, figure 2 illustrates the impact of representation on student outcomes at various 
levels of total revenue. For both racial groups in the model, when predicting the impact 
of representation on high achieving performance outcomes, the amount of resources will 
influence representation. Beginning first with Black gifted and talented performance, on 
average for districts that experience an increase in total revenue, Black teacher 
representation has an increasingly positive effect on the Black student participation in 
gifted and talented programs. In fact, for districts that experience a significant financial 
shock and decline of 3 to 5 percent of their total revenue, Black teacher representation 
has no significant effect on student gifted and talented placement. At lower levels of 
negative financial shock or economic gains to the organization, representation becomes 
more effective. This finding supports hypothesis one that predicts an increase in 
resources will positively influence representation.  
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Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Representation on G/T Students across Total 
Revenue 
 
However, the relationship between Latino teachers and student outcomes provides an 
interesting and unexplainable finding. As the money provided through total revenue 
increases, on average the impact of Latino teachers on Latino gifted and talented 
participation decreases. In districts experiencing a decrease in resources, Latino teachers 
on average maintain a positive impact on Latino gifted and talented placement. Yet, 
where there are additional gains in resources, Latino teachers have less influence on 
student gifted and talented placement.  Nonetheless, across levels of total revenue, the 
impact of representation does not statistically differ.  
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Similarly, in models predicting minority student expulsions, an increase in total 
revenue does not have a significant effect on the relationship between minority teachers 
and minority student outcomes.  This finding is consistent across Black and Latino 
student expulsions and illustrates the inconsistent effects of resources like total revenue. 
Total revenue is only found to positively influence representation in one of four models.  
However, when organizations experience financial shocks in areas that are designed 
to promote bureaucratic assistance and quality, the results are quite different. If you 
recall, hypothesis two expects that as resources allocated toward instructional 
expenditures increase, the impact of minority representation on minority student 
outcomes will be positive and even greater than the impact of total revenue resources. 
The findings illustrated in figures 3 and 4 demonstrate support for this hypothesis.  
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Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Representation on G/T Students across 
Instructional Expenditures 
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Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Representation on Expulsions across Instructional 
Expenditures 
 
Beginning with figure 3, the impact of instructional expenditures on the relationship 
between minority teacher representation and student participation in gifted and talented 
programs is positive. In fact, the impact of instructional expenditures demonstrates a 
relationship more beneficial for representation than the effects witnessed across levels of 
total revenue. The maximum marginal effect that a Black teacher can have on Black 
student participation in gifted and talented is larger when there are positive changes in 
instructional expenditures (by 0.10 percent).  On average, Black teachers in districts that 
experience a loss of instructional expenditures, have no significant effect on gifted and 
talented outcomes. When the financial shock is minimal or positive, Black teachers, 
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however, have a significant positive impact and can increase the percentage of Black 
student in gifted programming. 
For Latino teachers, although the relationship in figure 3 is increasing, it is not 
significantly different from zero across levels of instructional spending. In contrast to the 
effects of total revenue that produced a negative relationship between Latino teacher 
representation and student outcomes, instructional expenditures proves to be a more 
effective allocation of funds for performance.  
When predicting the relationship between minority teachers and minority student 
expulsions, figure 4 illustrates that instructional expenditures are consistently beneficial 
as well. As the resources allocated for instructional expenditures increases, the percent 
of Black teachers in the district will decrease the percent of expulsions distributed to 
Black students. The same is true for Latino teachers and students where resources 
improve the effectiveness of Latino teachers on reducing Latino student expulsions. 
Across the range of instructional expenditures, increasing resources in this area shifts the 
relationship between teachers and students from positive to negative. In other words, in 
organizations that experience a decline in instructional spending, on average minority 
teachers increase minority student expulsions. However, when districts are faced with 
unexpected funding for instruction, minority teachers begin to have an insignificant 
affect on expulsions (around -0.5 percent or no change) and eventually will decrease the 
percent of minority students experiencing expulsion.  
While independently Black and Latino teachers did not have a significant effect on 
minority student expulsions, instructional expenditures demonstrates an investment of 
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resources that will produce an effective bureaucracy and result in successful 
representation. The differing effect across models implies that the effect of minority 
teacher representation is contingent on resources. The resulting significant findings 
across outcome variables and racial groups additionally provide support for the claim 
that certain types of resources can better promote representation in an organization. 
Among the control variables in these analyses, the majority of variables including the 
percent of minority students, program size, Black and Latino education, and income 
frequently influence minority student outcomes. However, in table 2 Latino income led 
to a significant decrease in Latino gifted and talented placement. Each of these control 
variables obtains a 0.05 level of statistical significance. Partisanship has an interesting 
effect across minority groups where Black students benefit in majority democratic 
school districts. However, across all models Latino students are not significantly affected 
by the partisanship in the school district. A control variable that remains insignificant 
across all models is the racial representation among administration. These findings align 
with the literature that argues representation among administration and local school 
boards is important in the hiring of more racially diverse faculty. However, once 
representation exists in the classroom, street-level bureaucrats have a much greater affect 
on student outcomes (Meier and O’Toole 2006a). 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Across the United States minority clients achieve poorer performance when it comes 
to organizational performance and access to public services. Representation as a process 
to mitigate and correct for these outcomes can be beneficial to attain equity of outcomes 
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and opportunity. However, the organization’s financial resources may prevent minority 
bureaucrats from acting in the interests of their minority clients. 
The results of these analyses demonstrate not only that money matters for 
representation, but also that resources applied to the organization’s technical core can 
improve representation. When analyzing the effect of total revenue on representation, the 
influence of simply more resources does not maintain consistent results across racial 
groups or performance indicators. Finding that a simple increase in more total resources 
is only positively related to the relationship between Black teachers and Black students 
in gifted and talented courses, the findings did not consistently support hypothesis one.  
However, the interesting story was found when analyzing the effect of resources 
invested in the bureaucracy’s technical core. Changes in instructional expenditures that 
can provide additional slack specifically to bureaucratic actors can provide bureaucrats 
with room for movement and assistance in their daily work. By potentially increasing 
discretion in the organization, minority bureaucrats are allowed the additional resources 
needed to act in the interests of minority clients. The analysis in this research finds that 
instructional expenditures will affect representation in a positive manner in 3 out of 4 
models.5 For Black and Latino students in gifted and talented courses, an increase in 
instructional expenditures may provide teachers with the assistance needed to identify 
students that are normally overlooked but suited for gifted and talented education. 
                                                 
5 These results are robust and consistent across all models of instruction and minority 
representation found in Appendix A (tables 15-18), which include time and district fixed 
effects. Therefore, the percent change within a district in instructional expenditures is 
influential to minority representation on student outcomes. 
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Similarly, the provision of slack resources to the bureaucracy that are targeted at the 
technical core of the organization can promote the advancement of street-level 
bureaucrats. For this reason, investment in the bureaucratic core of the organization is 
potentially correlated with the quality of teachers. If a district can improve quality 
teaching by investing in teacher development, schools have the potential to cultivate 
personnel that have more productive methods of classroom management and reach the 
academic needs of all students. When students perform better academically, research 
indicates that these students are less likely to experience issues with discipline (Gregory 
et al 2010). As a result, an increase in resources dedicated to bureaucratic advancement, 
can promote effective representation as minority teachers have a negative effect on 
minority students experiencing expulsions.  
These findings imply that when sufficient resources are invested in the bureaucracy, 
resources will influence bureaucratic processes and behaviors. The story illustrated 
through this research falls directly in line with education scholarship that explains 
overall resources are not predictive of performance but resources invested in program 
development and teacher quality directly improve student achievement (Darling-
Hammond 2004). For public administration scholars the impact of these findings goes 
beyond the setting of U.S. public education. For many local service providers from 
welfare to public health and more, organizations that are funded by local revenue often 
face difficulties in achieving equitable service delivery across minority groups. The 
importance of external context on representation is also applicable outside of the U.S. in 
bureaucratic systems where funding is regulated at the local level.  
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Therefore, in order to address performance concerns and create effective 
bureaucratic representation, it is important that the bureaucracy create processes to 
address revenue changes. This research suggests that when faced with a stressed 
organizational environment, public organizations should be cautious to implement 
centralization processes as a means to maintain performance. Instead, good management 
can focus on protecting bureaucratic processes such as, active representation that will in 
turn maintain organizational performance. 
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4. IT TAKES A VILLAGE: MINORITY SOCIAL CAPITAL, 
REPRESENTATION, AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE 
 
In the past year, public outcry against racial disparities in education, policing, and 
social services have reached modern day heights. While bureaucrats attempt to address 
these disparities with human capital such as, increased representation, resources, and 
infrastructure, the depth of these issues continue to grow. What remains, however, is an 
understanding that communities matter for bureaucratic performance. Yet, social capital 
and community engagement is declining across groups (Putnam 1995). In a culture so 
content with ‘bowling alone,’ this chapter seeks to understand how social capital will 
influence outcomes directly and act as a co-productive facilitator for public bureaucrats.  
Social capital or connections among individuals is known to influence positive 
outcomes across policy areas (John 2005; Putnam 2001, Lochner et al 2003). For this 
reason, some have looked to social capital to help decrease disparities between white and 
minority individuals. In fact, it can be argued that the influence of social capital is best 
illustrated within minority communities. Throughout the 1900s, de jure and de facto 
segregation left many Black Americans to depend on their own communities for survival 
and advancement.  Likewise social spaces and community engagement through venues 
such as the African-American church became a bedrock for future political activism 
(McDaniel 2008; Lui, Austin, and Orey 2009). Among Latino communities, community 
networks and connections have also operated as a quasi-immigration service helping 
new immigrants locate and find work upon arrival to the United States (Aguilera and 
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Massey 2003).  Although the presence and importance of community engagement in 
minority communities exists, however, researchers have failed to appropriately study the 
influence of social capital within these communities. Instead past research has used 
broad, aggregate measures of social capital to explain minority group outcomes. As a 
result, the findings have been mixed because aggregate levels of social capital are often 
more descriptive of behaviors within the white community.  
This article hopes to address these issues by presenting a new measure of social 
capital for multiple racial groups within major US counties in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 
2012. In the context of U.S. public school communities, this research will explore the 
ways in which a community’s social capital and minority teacher representation will 
affect minority student outcomes. Proposing that social capital will act as a co-
productive facilitator for public bureaucrats, this research finds that social capital 
measured within minority communities does not directly influence minority student 
performance. But, social capital is an influential resource that indirectly promotes the 
effectiveness of minority teachers for minority student performance. While it is no 
surprise that student achievement is dependent on both the work of teachers and the 
influence of their school community, this research supports the broad understanding that 
teachers and bureaucrats’ work is only enhanced by cooperation within their ‘village’.  
4.1 Social Capital Theory 
Social capital refers to the “networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 2001, 664).” Social 
capital is caused by a reciprocal relationship between participation and trust. In a study 
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by Brehm and Rhan (1997), the authors trace the causes of social capital and find a 
strong relationship between an engaged citizenry and an increase in the levels of trust 
between individuals. More trusting individuals are likely to be engaged within their 
community (Uslaner and Brown 2005). As this engagement helps develop relationships 
and strengthen one’s political confidence, citizens are willing to engage politically with 
government institutions to pursue shared goals. The presence of social capital then leads 
to a variety of positive outcomes for communities that work together toward a collective 
good. For instance, social capital and one’s engagement with others in the community 
will influence the communities’ ability to solve collective problems or attain positive 
outcomes. Not only do the networks between individuals facilitate a space to create 
agreement and solve collective problems, but also social capital can lead to government 
responsiveness. When citizens are engaged in politically relevant social networks, their 
likelihood of participation in government increases (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). 
Politically engaged communities then have the political power to hold governments 
accountable to certain levels of performance (Knack 2002). In multiple studies, social 
capital is associated with an improvement in education performance  (John 2005; 
Putnam 2001), health outcomes (Lochner et al 2003), crime rates (Rosenfeld et al 2001) 
and poverty (Hero 2003).  
There does exist, however a ‘dark side’ of social capital. Specifically, scholars call 
attention to the fact that most individuals engage in groups with others who share similar 
characteristics. As a result, when engagement is focused inward and is exclusive to 
some, community engagement can have negative effects on broad community interests 
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and goals. In multiple studies of public education, researchers (Hero 2003) found that 
while overall rates of minority performance improved as social capital increased, higher 
levels of social capital were related to an increase in the gap between whites and 
minorities suspension rates (Hawes and Rocha 2011, Hero 2003). Hero (2007) contends 
that, “the assertion that higher social capital leads to better outcomes results almost 
entirely from the situation of whites…(155).” Contrary to Putnam (2001) this 
characterization implies that bonding characteristics limit the benefits of social capital 
and community engagement. Social capital and the strength of community networks are 
then relatively beneficial to racially homogenous, non-minority groups. In combination 
with the racial threat hypothesis, it is possible that in relatively heterogeneous areas, 
levels of social capital among whites are a method to further withhold resources from 
minority communities.  
When applied to government performance and processes, this same fear prevails 
across research areas. In an analysis of public policy agreement, Hill and Masubayshi 
(2005) find that bonding social capital actually decreases agreement between elites and 
the mass public. Similarly, measures of bonding social capital that focused on individual 
rather than broad community interests were found to have no effect on government 
performance and bureaucratic outcomes (Knack 2002). On the other hand, when social 
capital was measured using indicators of generalized reciprocity such as, social trust, 
volunteering, and promptly responding to the census, social capital boosts government 
performance.  These findings imply that bonding social capital may have a negative 
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effect on democratic outcomes as the strength of social connectivity between in-group 
members potentially comes at an expense to overall cohesion.  
The threat of bonding social capital is even more important when we consider social 
capital’s potential interaction with government processes such as, collaboration. Public 
administration scholars have explored the dynamic effects of social capital on 
collaboration. Specifically, Oh and Bush (2016) explain that social networks have 
influential effects during every phase of the collaborative process. Government 
outcomes are then expected to increase where social capital creates trust that facilitates 
reciprocity, shared information, and commitment to the collaborative process. Because 
bonding social capital is focused within groups, the potential to develop a commitment 
to overall community efforts and expose citizens to broad information is often limited 
(Leung et al 2016). In fact, research indicates that bonding social capital has a negative 
effect on the level of trust in government (Myeong and Seo 2016). If bonding social 
capital potentially suppresses the trust that facilitates government collaboration, 
bureaucratic processes meant to serve disadvantaged and excluded communities may be 
disrupted.   
4.2 Bureaucratic Representation 
One bureaucratic process that receives significant attention in the literature is that of 
representation. Representation is composed of passive and active representation. While 
passive representation describes the degree of descriptive representation within the 
bureaucracy, active representation is a process of action that leads to improved outcomes 
and policy gains for underrepresented groups. Passive representation is expected to lead 
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to active representation once bureaucrats have sufficient discretion to influence 
outcomes in an identity salient policy area.  
Most often the discussion of active representation refers to bureaucrats acting on 
behalf of or in the interest of co-minority citizens. This process of representation is 
illustrated in schools where minority teachers influence a decline in punitive discipline 
policies by favoring learning-oriented discipline policies (Roch et al 2010). While this 
process of representation is most often noted in the literature, movement from passive to 
active does not just occur. Instead, active representation in this sense requires a sense of 
shared commonality between the bureaucrat and the client. This commonality provides 
bureaucrats with better cultural and social awareness of client groups. Bureaucrats can 
then use this awareness to approach problems in culturally relevant ways.  
However, there are a variety of characteristics that may affect movement from 
passive to active representation. For instance, minority bureaucrats must decide first to 
be a representative. While the literature frequently assumes action based on shared group 
identification, bureaucrats must decide whether their sense of shared commonality is 
strong enough to warrant action on behalf of the group. Oftentimes the socialization of 
the organization, an individual’s commitment to the profession (Nigro and Meier 1975) 
or, an individual’s desires of promotion within that profession (Carroll 2017) may 
interfere and discourage movement to active representation.  
Second, active representation is possible when descriptive or passive representation 
encourages non-minority bureaucrats to act according to minority interests. In this case 
non-minority bureaucrats or elected officials are able to learn from their interactions 
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with minority colleagues. By engaging with diverse bureaucrats, non-minorities are 
exposed to social differences and concerns of diverse communities that will influence 
bureaucratic actions. At the judicial level, Kastellec (2013) found that the mere presence 
of a minority judge had a peer effect that resulted in an increased likelihood of 
nonminority judges voting in favor of affirmative action.  
Last, active representation is possible when the presence of minority representatives 
activates a response among clients (Riccucci et al 2016). Best exemplified in law 
enforcement, gender representation on the police force was related to an increase in the 
number of sexual assaults reported (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). In this example, 
Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) explain that a women victim may be more inclined 
to report a rape or assault when she perceives the police force is representative. A similar 
example is present in Georgia public schools where Atkins and Wilkins (2013) found 
that female minority teachers were related to a decrease in minority student pregnancy 
rates because female students were willing to approach and discuss sexual education 
with these bureaucrats. Although active representation is typically considered to be 
activity on the part of the bureaucrat, the process of representation here appears to be 
highly dependent on client behaviors.  
Client behavior then becomes a determining factor in translating passive to active 
representation. This citizen participation or process of co-production is a relationship 
“between professionalized service providers…and service users or other members of the 
community…(Bovaird 2007, 847).” Within this relationship, citizens help contribute to 
the quality and quantity of public service delivery by directly assisting local officials, 
  70 
bringing about changes within their own behavior, and or changing behaviors in a way 
that addresses concerns facing the organization’s environment (Sharp 1980, Alford 
1998). Scholars propose that co-production creates multiple benefits for public 
organizations including enhancing performance outcomes, lowering budgetary costs, 
enhancing public agency accountability, and increasing citizen knowledge and 
participation (Percy 1984, Sharp 1980, Marschall 2004, Bovaird 2007, Pestoff 2006). 
Co-production is best illustrated in representative bureaucracy in the work of Meier 
and Nicholson-Crotty (2006). In this example, the authors found that female clients 
provided inputs for police departments by reporting sexual assaults and as a result 
assisted local officials in the performance of their duties. The ability of law enforcement 
agencies to better perform their jobs was enhanced as a result of client provided 
information. Next, client co-production is most effective where clients transform their 
own behaviors (Sharp 1980). Within representation, Atkins and Wilkins (2013) illustrate 
this transformation with the role-model effect. In their example the presence of minority 
teachers encouraged students not only to request needed assistance and work with 
bureaucrats to develop effective services, but also bureaucratic role models encourage 
students to change their behaviors. However, when clients are less likely to engage with 
bureaucrats, the potential role-model effect will be inactivated and there will be little 
improvement in outcomes. Last, client efforts are crucial in regards to observed 
performance outcomes. For instance, minority teachers cannot help decrease the rates of 
Black student pregnancy if students did not implement the sex education that was 
provided. When clients participate in a manner that strengthens a bureaucrat’s sense of 
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commonality, holds bureaucrats accountable, and/or shares information that will assist in 
the production of organizational outcomes, bureaucrats will likely be encouraged to 
work in pursuit of better outcomes. An increase in minority group social capital, which 
helps build trust between minority citizens and their bureaucratic peers may then work as 
a co-productive facilitator that enhances the bureaucratic process of representation. 
4.3 Theory 
The organization’s external community is expected to influence bureaucratic 
representation in potentially two ways. First, a high degree of social capital can promote 
organizational processes such as, co-production. As this process hold bureaucrats more 
accountable to client needs, the likelihood of bureaucrats acting on behalf of clients is 
increased. In addition, social capital indicates the presence of community resources that 
may potentially influence the impact of bureaucratic representation on client outcomes. 
As both bureaucrats and clients engage in high social capital communities, 
representative behaviors are more likely to produce positive outcomes.  
Public education provides an exemplar case of co-production as its foundation and 
continuance is dependent on the relationship between bureaucrats (or educators) and 
community members. Practitioner reports in education have lamented that although 
schools attempt to adjust for educational disparities through improving funding and 
teacher quality, these efforts cannot be effective without the support of the school 
community (Roekel 2008). In fact, historically public schools were designed to be a 
community effort where local residents and parents came together to make decisions in 
the best interests of students. Contemporarily, the focus remains on the importance of 
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parental involvement. Yet, social capital has the ability to account for broader 
community wide engagement that encompasses participation by those who are not 
directly linked to the schools. For instance, in Durham, North Carolina educators began 
asking people from the community, faith-based organizations, and parents ‘how can 
[they] help [these] schools?’ From the perspective of administrators, community 
organizers, and education associations, improving the school district requires that the 
community become involved as the public schools belong to these residents (Milliken 
2010).  
In accordance with previous literature (Jensen and Svendsen 2011), I expect that 
social capital or community efforts for the sake of the public good will have a direct and 
positive impact on outcomes by increasing bureaucratic accountability and extending 
opportunity to all members of the community. The ability of social capital to lead to 
policies results from its direct correlation with a politically engaged community. 
Politically engaged citizens keep bureaucrats accountable and additionally utilize their 
political power to pursue policy. In a cross-national study, Bjornskov and Svendsen 
(2013) found that communities with high social capital are willing to invest in public 
programs. Where social capital is greater, I would expect a greater willingness among 
community members to address educators with their grievances and potential solutions. 
In 2007, the Durham volunteer director stated to The Herald-Sun that her job was to 
reach out to those underrepresented and not only ‘[talk] to parents but, more importantly, 
[listen] to them (Hinchcliffe 2007).’ 
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In education, where social capital is present, school educators have a venue for 
collaboration between parents, students, and the community. The ability of social capital 
to create collaborative partnerships provides a social good by increasing interactions 
among individuals who may not usually be in contact. If social capital represents a true 
bridging phenomenon, it is likely that groups will be in contact with those who are not a 
member of their in-group. Intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) suggests that under 
optimal circumstances where there is intergroup cooperation, groups have equal status 
during contact, and groups share a common goal, increased contact between groups can 
reduce intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Increased interactions between 
groups and the development of social capital has the ability to minimize differences, 
foster trust, and create better opportunities for marginalized and underprivileged groups. 
H1a: Social capital will positively influence the size of social programs. 
H1b: Social capital will positively influence minority client opportunities. 
However, it is often the case that social capital does not exemplified a bridging 
phenomenon. Within education, the history of neighborhood segregation has often left 
many minority residents in majority minority schools. Like many majority minority 
communities, in 2007 there were 11 failing public schools in Duval County, Florida. 
And each of these schools was located in African-American communities. Columnist, 
Bill Maxwell, proclaimed that “If the failing schools are in the black community, the 
black community shares essential responsibility for the schools’ poor performance 
(Maxwell 2007).” And while this is indeed partly true, the current research fails to 
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provide an appropriate measure of social capital or community engagement within 
minority groups.  
Research by Uslaner and Conley (2003) indicate that those with narrower social 
networks tend to either withdraw from civic life or engage only within the community 
with which they identify. This finding is exemplified within minority groups because 
their historic and contemporary experiences lead to them to have faith only in their own 
group. Although research (Knack 2002, Leung et al 2016) expresses a fear that within 
group social capital will negatively affect outcomes broadly, most research does not take 
into account the benefits of growing social capital among minority groups. For instance, 
within immigrant communities, Aguilera and Massey (2003) illustrate social capital by 
explaining how communities in ‘receiver’ cities provide a network for employment, 
housing, and familial/non-familial support to new migrants.  In African-American 
communities, research also describes the African-American church as a resource for 
community engagement as the church provides a social network that can increase 
education outcomes and even act as an avenue for political participation (Liu et al 2009, 
Fitzgerald and Spohn 2005, McDaniel 2008, Barrett 2010).   
Minority communities, who often experience disparities in public goods or services, 
are expected to benefit from a growth of social capital within their minority community. 
Primarily, social capital within a minority community has the possibility to enhance the 
cultural capital of the community group. Cultural capital creates a sense of group 
belonging, collective identity, and group consciousness. In a world of extrinsic prejudice 
and intrinsic racism, the support of cultural capital can provide a space of 
  75 
encouragement and support for minority individuals (Yosso 2005). The growth of social 
capital within a minority community is then not only a benefit to the community but also 
a benefit to oneself. In addition, social capital provides a network of supportive 
individuals who can act as role models for younger citizens as they develop into social 
and political citizens. As minority communities develop increased trust and engagement, 
find their political voice, and maintain a political influence through community 
interaction, I expect disparities in outcomes to decline. 
H2: Social capital within minority groups will have an even greater, positive effect 
on minority client outcomes. 
Last, social capital is expected to have an indirect impact on outcomes as its 
development creates a co-productive resource for bureaucrats. The coproduction 
literatures acknowledges that ‘without active citizen participation the capacity of 
government to provide public goods and services is severely compromised (Marschall 
2004, 232).” Schools provide the best example because within this institution both 
teachers and parents must be willing to reach out to each other to find the best approach 
for a student. This co-production requires an assertive and engaged client but also a 
receptive bureaucrat.   
Social capital can potentially act as a co-productive facilitator by first empowering 
citizen participation. Tavits (2006) found that trust, volunteering, membership, and 
informal socializing were all related to increased political activism. When citizens 
engage with their community, their collective confidence is transferred to the individual 
who begins to participate, voice grievances, and hold government accountable.  
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Also, because bureaucrats are members of the community, high levels of social 
capital imply bureaucratic involvement. In fact, Brewer (2003) finds that public 
employment is seen as a predictor of civic engagement. When bureaucrats are involved, 
they become aware not only of the concerns of the community but resources as well. 
Marschall (2006) found that the more knowledgeable teachers were about their schools’ 
community, the greater influence teachers had on performance. In fact, the influence of a 
teacher’s community awareness far outweighed the influence of parental involvement on 
performance. In addition, a bureaucrat’s active participation in the community may also 
help dispel clients’ negative perceptions of government. For example, Watkins-Hayes 
(2011) explains that clients did not feel bureaucrats were concerned about their 
individual cases or influenced by their shared identity status. Some argue that these 
concerns arise due to a difference in class or socialization between minority bureaucrats 
and clients. However, in a high social capital region, I would expect bureaucrats to be 
active participants in the community.  
As increased interactions help to minimize differences and develop relationships 
with bureaucrats, clients begin to view bureaucrats beyond their role as a public servant. 
When there is confidence in the bureaucracy, clients are willing to engage in 
partnerships, share information, and actively work toward a collective good. Increased 
social capital then creates a space for understanding between both the bureaucrat and 
client. This increase in cooperation should lead to better efficiency for public 
organizations. 
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H3: Social capital will positively influence the effectiveness of minority bureaucrats 
on minority client outcomes.  
4.4 Data and Methods 
The previous hypotheses will be tested in the context of US elementary and 
secondary public education. Public school districts present a good context to study social 
capital, bureaucracy, and outcomes. The local nature of public schooling from its 
dependence on local property taxes to local board elections imply a community context 
where social capital can be developed. In public schools school administrators and 
teachers have significant discretion, which will allow them to have independent effects 
on student outcomes. Last, public education has multiple achievement indicators 
available that provide objective measures of district performance.  
Using a national sample of the largest United States school districts in 2002, 2004, 
2008, and 2012, the analysis will first model the independent effects of community 
social capital (H1a, H1b) and social capital within minority groups (H2). Next, I will add 
an interaction of teacher representation and social capital to determine if social capital 
acts as a co-productive mechanism for representation (H3). To analyze these 
relationships I will use OLS models with time fixed effects to control for the changes 
that occur across districts in different years.  I also control for the district level effects 
and potential correlation between districts by clustering the standard errors at the district 
level. The unit of analysis in these models will be the local school district. The school 
districts included in the research are the largest school districts in the U.S. in years 2002, 
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2004, 2008, and 2012.1  In the interaction models, I model within effects by adding 
district fixed effects as well. After pooling data from multiple sources across years, these 
analyses include approximately 2,000 individual cases.2 
4.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 In order to test hypothesis one, social opportunity is represented by two performance 
indicators: the size of high achievement programs and the size of disciplinary programs. 
These two indicators are operationalized by the percentage of students in gifted and 
talented programs and the percentage of students being expelled. I expect that social 
capital will expand opportunity, which will be visible in an increase in access to gifted 
and talented classrooms. On the contrary, students will experience less punishment in 
schools with expanded educational access.  
For the remaining hypotheses, the dependent variables are minority student group 
representation within the two categories: gifted and talented achievement and 
expulsions. Although ideal measures for student performance would be an average 
performance on state standardized testing, because this is a national sample there is no 
national equivalent at the district level. Instead, the dependent variable of minority 
outcomes in these models will be a high achievement and low achievement indicator. 
The high achievement indicator is the racial composition of gifted and talented 
classrooms in the district. The low achievement indicator is the racial composition of 
                                                 
1 The school districts chosen were those with more than 5,000 students as of 1999. The 
original sample included 5,493 school districts in the United States. 
2 Because social capital indicators by racial group were only available for the largest 
counties, many cases were removed from the dataset once social capital was included. 
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students experiencing school discipline. I operationalized these performance variables by 
the percentage of gifted and talented students that are Black and Latino. To create these 
variables, I created a percentage by dividing the aggregate number of Black students in 
gifted and talented programs by the total number of students in the gifted and talented 
program and multiplying by 100. I completed the same process for Latino students in 
gifted and talented classrooms. To measure student expulsions by race, I also created a 
variable measuring the percentage of student expulsions that included Black and Latino 
students. All dependent variables were collected from the Office for Civil Rights, which 
records data on student class placement, special education programs, discipline 
outcomes, and a variety of other student outcomes by race at the district level. 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
The main independent variable of interest in this research is social capital. In the 
context of education, many contend that social capital is not distinctly different from the 
commonly used indicator of parental involvement. In fact, many education scholars use 
measures of parental involvement to conceptualize a school’s social capital (Perna and 
Titus 2005). I argue, however, that the social capital thesis is distinct from the current 
literature on parent participation and school achievement. Social capital describes a 
phenomenon beyond parental involvement because it measures a variety of participatory 
behaviors that are pursued in an effort to achieve a public good.  
A measure of social capital will also capture the involvement of community 
members other than parents who may not be directly connected with the school but who 
provide a positive network for students. Although many low-income and minority 
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schools struggle to achieve high levels of parental involvement, which is often 
dependent on income and parental education levels (Ramirez 2003; Crozier 2001), high 
social capital can potentially still be present and influential as other community members 
fulfill this role. For students whose parents have non-typical work hours and struggle to 
be present at school, an engaged community may indicate additional invested adults who 
can fulfill that role. This process is most likely prominent within minority communities 
where marginalized groups have difficulty becoming involved in traditional forms of 
parental involvement (Singh et al 1995, Crozier 2001).  
Social capital in this research will be measured using an indicator of community 
cooperative behavior from the PERG Social Capital Project. Using the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, this project conceptualizes and measures public 
and private social capital at the state and county level. In addition, the project produced a 
measure of social capital by racial groups at the county level by aggregating racial group 
responses within each county available. The dataset ranges from 2002-2015. Public 
social capital, which is used in this research, captures measures of community 
volunteerism and engagement in public affairs. This measure essentially captures 
engagement in public social settings for the sake of public policy. The measure is a 
factor variable of multiple questions regarding individual’s political and social behaviors 
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(see Table 5). This measure of public social capital has a significant correlation 
coefficient of 0.77 with Putnam’s SC Index.3
Table 5. Measure of Public Social Capital 
Eigenvalue 4.15 
Cumulative Explained 0.54 




Engagement in Public 
Affairs 
Attend Pub. Meeting 0.80 0.24 
Participate in Boycott 0.56 0.65 
Political Org. Participation 0.50 0.59 
Voted 0.33 0.74 




Fixed a Problem in 
Community 
0.79 0.37 









Survey Item Factor 
Loadings 
Uniqueness 
Volunteer Abroad 0.55 0.22 
Donated Food, Money, 
Etc. to charity 
0.45 0.30 
Volunteer Long Distance 
(>50 mi.) 
0.44 0.04 
Public Health Participation 0.41 0.72 
The second variable of interest will be representation among street-level bureaucrats. 
This variable was collected as a part of the PERG National School Survey distributed to 
3 Within the models, the unit of analysis is the school district. Because counties overlap 
with districts, districts within the same county will not experience variation in their 
social capital indicators. 
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school districts with more than 5,000 students as of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). 
These surveys were distributed by mail in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Of the 5,493 
districts, the survey had a response rate of 94.5 percent. This survey collected data on the 
racial representation of public school districts’ teachers, administration, and elected 
school board members. For minority teacher representation, I include separate measures 
of the percentage of Black and Latino teachers in the district.  
4.4.3 Control Variables 
In order to account for relationships that may influence the dependent or independent 
variables, I will control for a variety of organizational and community characteristics. 
Because policy is often decided at the administrative level, I have also included variables 
that capture the amount of minority representation present among administration. 
Administrative representation is measured by the percent of Latino and Black 
administrators in the district in each year. These data were gathered as a part of the 
PERG National School Survey.  
I also expect the student population or organizational clientele will influence the 
outcomes of minority students. With respect to the racial group of interest in each model, 
I have controlled for the percentage of Latino and Black students in the district. Overall 
student population is also used as a control variable in models predicting gifted and 
talented program size as well as the percentage of total expulsions. The student 
population is operationalized by logged enrollment in the school district.  
In the necessary models (H1b-H3), I include a control variable for the size of the 
gifted and talented program and total expulsions in the district. In some districts the 
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implementation of certain policies (i.e. zero-tolerance) have created an environment 
where certain outcomes are more likely (Evenson et al 2009). I expect that where the 
gifted and talented programs are larger and the rate of total expulsion is greater, the 
outcomes for minority students will be greater as well. To operationalize this variable, in 
models that predict gifted and talented, I control for the percentage of students in the 
district that are in gifted and talented programs. When the outcome variable is expulsion 
of minority students, the program size variable is operationalized by the percentage of 
total students in the district that are expelled.  
The final organizational control variables included in the models will be a measure 
of financial resources in each district. Given the local context of school district funding 
and policies that monitor district resources, many of the gaps in student outcomes are 
projected to be a result of funding differences. I expect that in districts with more 
resources gifted and talented programs will be larger and identification practices for 
students will be more inclusive. Similarly in these districts, I expect fewer expulsions as 
a result of an investment of discipline techniques and greater financial capital of 
students. The total revenue per pupil received in the district will operationalize financial 
resources. This variable was gathered from the National Center for Education Statistics, 
Common Core of Data.  
Although, variables at the organizational level will certainly influence student 
performance, education scholars have explained for decades that physical capital and 
resources are highly influential as well (Davis-Kean 2005). For this reason, I have also 
included a variety of district characteristics that are known to influence student 
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outcomes. First, parental education and income are two of the most consistent predictors 
of student performance (Desimone 1999). Because this analysis does not observe 
education and income at the individual level, I have gathered U.S. Census data on the 
education and income of minority groups within the school district. To control for 
education, I will use the percentage of White, Black, and Latino individuals in the school 
district with a college degree or greater. To control for income, I use the average income 
for Black and Latino families in the district. In overall models of social opportunity 
(H1a), income is operationalized by the median income in the district.  
Last, I will control for the partisanship of the school district. To control for 
partisanship I will use the same measure employed by Meier and Rutherford (2014) to 
measure the average percentage of individuals in the school district that voted for 
President Obama in 2004 and 2008. Recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) 
find that in Republican school districts African-American students are more likely to 
have poorer results across performance outcomes including gifted and talented 
placement, suspensions, expulsions, and standardized test achievement.  
4.5 Results 
Beginning with a base model that tests the influence of social capital on social 
opportunities, the analysis (table 20 found in Appendix B) indicates that public social 
capital does not have a significant effect on gifted and talented program size or total 
expulsions. Instead, as expected, district education, Democratic voting, and income 
significantly influence these variables. The significance of many community 
characteristics such as, education and Democratic voting indicate that there are factors 
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beyond the organization that relate to social opportunity. However, the models explain 
very little variance in the dependent variables. Although research explains that access to 
gifted and talented programs and growth of disciplinary programs are highly correlated 
with financial revenue and minority student population, these variables explain very 
little in this model. The lack of explained variance may be a result of missing variables 
such as the percentage of low-income students in the district or additional academic 
achievement indicators. The data available, however, do not provide consistent measures 
of these variables.   
Next, when analyzing the effect of social capital on minority programs (H1b), there 
are mixed findings.4 When observing the effect of social capital on Black student 
outcomes, overall social capital in the county has no significant effect. However, only 
Black teachers positively influence high achievement indicators. For Latino students, 
social capital does have a significant effect on both outcome variables for Latino 
students. These effects, however, are in the opposite direction.  An increase in social 
capital by one standard deviation will decrease Latino gifted and talented student 
representation by 0.44 percent and decrease Latino expulsions by 1.42 percent. Similar, 
to parallel models for Black student outcomes, these models indicates that where social 
capital within groups is ineffective to boost performance, once again minority 
bureaucrats are significantly influential. An increase in Latino teacher representation by 
10 percent can substantially increase Latino gifted and talented students by 3.2 percent.  
                                                 
4 The models for H1b can be found in Appendix B, Table 21.  
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Next, hypothesis 2 expected that social capital would have an even greater effect on 
minority outcomes when measured within minority groups. In other words, minority 
community cooperation efforts would affect minority students independently. For Black 
student outcomes, Black social capital has no significant effect. Instead, for gifted and 
talented outcomes, Black teachers are again effective. In the analyses predicting Latino 
student outcomes, Latino social capital has a statistically significant effect. However, for 
both gifted and talented representation and expulsions, the influence of social capital is 
in the negative direction.5 A one standard deviation increase in social capital will 
decrease Latino gifted and talented students by 0.53 percent and increase Latino 
expulsions by 1.7 percent. As expected total revenue per pupil, minority group income, 
college graduates, program size, and minority student representation significantly 
explain our dependent variables. The significance of these control variables indicate that 
although community factors expected to increase both social capital and educational 
achievement are significant to the model, the measure of minority involvement in 
traditional activities for the sake of the public good has a direct negative or insignificant 
effect on performance.   
However, this is not the case when minority community efforts assist the 
bureaucracy. The final hypothesis 3 expects that social capital will enhance the effect of 
minority bureaucrats by acting as a co-productive mechanism.6 And indeed in three out 
of four models, the interaction between social capital and representation are statistically 
                                                 
5 The models for hypothesis 2 can be located in Appendix B, table 22.  
6 The models for hypothesis 3 can be located in Appendix B, table 23. Figures are 
provided within the text to illustrate this relationship.  
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significant. Although Black social capital has an insignificant effect on Black student 
outcomes, when interacted with Black representation among street level bureaucrats, 
Black students excel on high achievement indicators. As Black social capital increases, 
the marginal effect of Black teachers on Black students in gifted and talented increases 
significantly as well (see figure 5). This finding indicates that social capital within the 
Black community can be a large asset to minority teachers as increased community 
efforts may provide a venue for teachers to share information on gifted and talented 
programs with parents. Likewise, involved communities are more likely to request 
access or testing for these programs. Engaged minority communities may also provide a 
space of encouragement for students, giving them confidence to pursue academic 
programs.  
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Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Black Teachers on Black G/T across Black Social 
Capital 
 
In addition, figures 6 and 7 indicates that unlike the negative, independent effects of 
Latino social capital on Latino student outcomes, when coupled with the efforts of 
bureaucrats, Latino students witness an increase in gifted and talented representation and 
a decrease in expulsions. Moving from low levels of social capital to high levels of 
social capital the maximum marginal effect of 10 percent Latino teacher representation 
is a possible 4 percent decrease in Latino expulsions. The positive effect of Latino social 
capital when interacted with representation indicates that Latino teachers have the ability 
to utilize the cohesion and engagement of the Latino community for the success of 
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students. For many Latino parents, some who are migrants and new to the American 
education system, teacher representation provides a point of cultural understanding. 
When teachers can access the efforts of parents outside of education and share the 
necessity of their engagement in their child’s education, students will benefit.  
 
Figure 6: The Marginal Effect of Latino Teachers on Latino G/T across Latino 
Social Capital 
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Figure 7: The Marginal Effect of Latino Teachers on Latino Expulsions across 
Latino Social Capital 
 
4.6 Discussion 
In a context of growing disparities between minority and majority groups, the 
influence of bureaucratic representation on minority group outcomes is a steady 
predictor of improved outcomes. However, the effect of representation is enhanced by 
the social context of the organization. And it is not surprising that bureaucrats work best 
in communities that are collaborative and engaged toward a public good.  
In most models, social capital within minority groups is found to enhance the 
marginal effect of minority bureaucrats. Unfortunately, given the limitations of the data, 
it is unknown whether the co-productive mechanism of social capital is the result of an 
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engaged clientele that holds government accountable, an engaged bureaucracy that is 
present and aware of the community context, or a combination of both that facilitates 
shared information. Nonetheless, this research finds that minority bureaucrats are 
expected to be more effective when operating in communities with high social capital.  
Unfortunately, I would not expect social capital to interact in similar ways with well-
trained white teachers because although these educators may be willing to engage with 
the community, the communities’ sense of trust of the bureaucrat may only be 
strengthened by shared minority status. 
Yet, most surprising within this research is the finding that overall or within minority 
group social capital will not independently influence social programs or minority 
outcomes in the positive direction. In fact in some cases, it had a negative effect.  For 
instance, table 22 indicates that Latino social capital has an independent and negative 
effect on both gifted and talented percentages and rates of expulsion. This finding is 
unique, because unlike research that simply would explain these results as an outcome of 
declining social capital, I find that even as social capital grows within the Latino 
community it produces harmful outcomes. Because of the generational diversity that is 
present among the Latino community, the data may be illustrating a recurring conflict 
among more established and migrant Latino communities. For instance, more 
established Latino communities might be less concerned if younger, likely recent-
immigrant groups are punished within American institutions. If these established 
communities are positively correlated with social capital, the data may be capturing 
trends within the community. 
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In addition, as mentioned previously, within minority communities social capital has 
been present historically but it is typically conceptualized in a different manner. For 
instance, within the Black community the African-American church has served as a 
place of collaboration to improve community outcomes. Yet, affiliation in this context 
and others (such as local business establishments) often goes unmeasured by our typical 
understanding of social capital. In other words, within minority communities the norms 
of social capital may be different and demonstrated in an immeasurable way. Whereas 
the current measure of social capital still captures traditional norms of cooperation that 
have historically been exclusive or uncommon among minority groups, it is possible that 
we are only capturing behaviors that were intended to further promote disadvantages 
among minority communities. A measure of social capital that captures its different 
conceptualizations might result in different outcomes. 
4.7 Conclusion 
For years, education practitioners have been aware of the importance of diversity 
among teachers. Recently education groups from Teach for America to the National 
Education Association have called for in increase in the recruitment of Black and Latino 
teachers. While blogs proclaim how important it is that students see and interact with 
teachers of diverse backgrounds, what often goes unsaid is how important it is that 
minority students have non-white teachers. This research hopes to change that 
conversation by explaining not only the importance of minority teacher representation 
for minority student access to opportunity, but for community engagement as well.  
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Beyond contributing a new measure of social capital, this research suggests that 
instead of expecting social capital to produce independent effects on outcomes, as was 
the case historically, contemporarily social capital may be best understood as a co-
productive facilitator for government. In this case social capital and its development 
should not only be left to citizens, but bureaucrats should work to develop social capital 
as it in turn will aid them in producing positive outcomes for the community (Jakobsen 
and Andersen 2013). If public administrators hope to better reach the needs of their 
clients, understanding contemporary patterns of social capital and increasing client’s 
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5. IT’S ALL ABOUT POLITICS: MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND 
POLITICAL CONTROL   
 
In the context of public education, although elected officials and appointed 
executives are at the core of school governance, few researchers have explored how 
politics interacts with teacher behaviors and decision-making. As public servants who 
are held accountable by appointed executives, managers, and their profession, teacher 
behaviors may be the result of top-down political influence within their district. Yet, as 
public citizens and constituents, it may also be the case that bureaucrats are highly 
influenced by bottom-up or public political actors. This research will compare the 
influence of top-down versus bottom-up political actors to determine from whom do 
street-level bureaucrats take their political cues. 
Every bureaucrat has multiple political principals. Political principals include elected 
officials, appointed managers, the public, interest groups, and bureaucratic professions 
(Waterman and Meier 1998, Wilson 1989, Downs 1967). The political science literature 
typically focuses on political forces in the form of top-down political control agents such 
as the chief executives and legislators (Calvert et al 1989, Eisner and Meier 1990, Wood 
and Waterman 1991). Within these top-down relationships, the principal’s goal is to 
control a response in the agent and they have a variety of tools at their disposal to 
influence desired bureaucratic behavior. However, political control can also manifest in 
a bottom-up process. Within this process rather than assuming that the electorate 
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influences policy because they have control over policy makers, the public can 
participate in policy-making directly through bureaucratic interaction.  
Active representation like most bureaucratic processes and goals becomes 
increasingly feasible with increased political support (Rourke 1984). Political support for 
the bureaucracy can come in the form of executive or legislative support, professional 
support, and even the public. This chapter explores the influence of various political 
actors on bureaucratic behaviors. Specifically, it asks how might elected officials and/or 
the public influence teacher representation? 
To study the influence of political actors on street-level bureaucratic behavior, I 
employ a survey of the largest school districts in the United States to capture school 
board representation. In addition, the data include past election results on the political 
leanings within the districts, which can serve as a proxy for the public interest. While the 
current literature is often focused on federal and state bureaucracies, observing political 
control within the local bureaucracy provides a unique and clearer context for research. 
Within the local bureaucracy, the potential influence of local elected officials and the 
public on bureaucratic behavior is probable because bureaucrats can personally interact 
with both actors. The preliminary results indicate that the most influential principal for 
representative behavior varies depending on the bureaucrat’s community context. While 
African-American representatives are effective when the public provides political 
support, Latino representatives find support in and are more effective when their values 
align with their elected officials. These findings imply that there is not a one size fit all 
model of representation. Although political context matters for representation, the 
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political structure of different communities will also play in role in producing 
substantive representation outcomes.  
5.1 Bureaucracy and Representation 
Lipsky explains “public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-
floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made 
in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers (2010, xii).” Street-
level bureaucrats are then situated at a unique and powerful position within the 
bureaucracy. As the public face of the bureaucracy and entity of government that works 
directly with the public, the characteristics and behaviors of street-level bureaucrats have 
far reaching effects. While often overlooked as policy makers, bureaucrats obtain 
various levels of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. Both of 
these qualities allow bureaucrats to determine the distribution of public goods and 
services, but it also allows bureaucrats to influence the organization’s policy agenda 
(Meyers and Vorsanger 2007).  
Bureaucratic influence is commonly recognized in agenda setting because 
bureaucrats control implementation. Therefore, their interpretation and support of 
policies can potentially influence how they are implemented. For example, survey results 
indicate that street level bureaucrats’ actions in pursuit of a policy goal are dependent on 
their perception, their endorsement, and their knowledge of a policy (May and Winter 
2009). The policy agenda can therefore be shifted in implementation when bureaucrats 
fail to understand or support its original goals.  In addition, bureaucratic perceptions of 
clients may influence disparate treatment and subsequent policy outcomes. Historically, 
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the effect of bureaucratic discretion coupled with implicit biases has affected outcomes 
for white and nonwhite clients across programs (Katznelson 2005). In a study of welfare 
sanctioning, Keiser et al (2004) found that the chance of sanctioning was decreased by 
23 percent if the recipient was white and that race influenced sanction rates across the 
state of Missouri. The authors found that the decision to extol sticks or carrots is 
available to bureaucrats not only because there exists a lack of monitoring but also 
because many of the rules and guidelines are open to interpretation. When given greater 
autonomy and discretion, subjective values and ideology can influence policy outcomes.  
For this reason maintaining a representative bureaucracy where bureaucrats represent 
client interests can influence the policy agenda. A representative bureaucracy is made up 
of both passive and active representation. Passive or descriptive representation describes 
the visible representativeness of a bureaucracy (Mosher 1968). Having a visibly diverse 
bureaucracy places bureaucrats of typically underrepresented groups in positions as 
public officials. For the public whose typical reference of government is through 
interactions with local bureaucrats, passive representation provides a symbolic benefit 
for citizens and is related to citizen satisfaction (Riccucci et al 2014), perceived 
government legitimacy (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009), and an increase in political 
efficacy (Atkeson and Carillo 2007).  
Passive representative translates to active representation as bureaucrats exercise 
discretion and act in the interests of their clients. Active representation is best 
represented where bureaucrats affect policy design. For instance, Roch et al (2010) 
explain that racial representation among teachers and school administrators promoted the 
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use of less punitive and more learning oriented disciplinary policies. As representatives 
of minority students, these bureaucrats were responsive to the visible inequities in 
disciplinary policies and considerate of client needs.  
Often, however, because of the wide discretion provided to bureaucrats, the exact 
activities taken by bureaucrats to improve client outcomes are unclear. For example, a 
variety of scholars have found that same-race teachers provide culturally congruent 
benefits to same-race students and influence their academic achievement (Meier 1993a, 
Dee 2005, Grissom et al 2015, Egalite et al 2015). This may be a result of minority 
bureaucrats serving as a role model and empowering client efficacy, minority 
bureaucrats being more empathic toward and responsive to same-race students, and/or 
minority bureaucrats potentially influencing their peers’ behaviors and providing them 
with tools to address the needs of minority client groups. 
Yet, bureaucrats work within constraints. And in order to determine appropriate 
behavior, bureaucrats look to their political principals and their organizational context 
for support of their actions.  As rational actors, bureaucrats seeking to be active 
representatives are likely only to engage in this behavior when the costs are low. The 
organization’s external political environment, therefore, could potentially change the 
calculus that determines active representation. Increased support, whether from 
hierarchical superiors or public client groups promotes agency among bureaucrats. When 
support is present, bureaucrats can confidently be active representatives without fear of 
administrative disapproval or organizational sanctions. In an organization where political 
principals are adversarial to the bureaucracy and do not support their goals of 
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representation for lack of resources or perceived need, active representation is unlikely. 
Therefore, value alignment between bureaucrats and their principals can potentially 
decrease some of the costs of active representation. Similar to other bureaucratic 
behaviors, bureaucratic representation may be contingent on the support of political 
principals.  
5.2 Political Control 
The majority of the literature on bureaucratic behavior and political control indicates 
that bureaucrats are responsive to the public as they are accountable to those who are 
hired by the public, i.e. elected officials (Redford 1969, Furlong 1998, Wood and 
Waterman 1991). The literature focuses strongly on the relationship between 
bureaucracies and elected officials for fear that bureaucracy may diverge from the 
interests of those officials and essentially fail to be responsive to the public. With a goal 
of maintaining democratic morality, research has been dedicated to understanding how 
to best control bureaucratic actors. Elected officials can successfully influence 
bureaucratic actions through a variety of methods. At the federal level congressional 
officials use methods such as, direct review of bureaucratic actions and political 
appointees to control bureaucratic behavior. In a survey of federal bureaucrats, elected 
executives and representatives were listed as having the most influence on bureaucratic 
policy (Furlong 1998). Less successful methods of control were found to be budget 
changes, legislation, and administrative reorganization (Wood and Waterman 1991). At 
the local level, however, direct contact between bureaucrats and officials is more likely. 
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Often local oversight can result in decreased bureaucratic discretion when the 
bureaucracy is at odds with their principals (Waterman et al 1998).  
Yet, can we assume that elected officials are the best conduits of the public interest? 
While the public can certainly keep elected officials accountable at the ballot box, a 
variety of sources indicate that there are cases when elected officials are not reflective of 
their constituents but instead are serving the needs of their party and/or their own 
ambitions (Herrick and Moore 1993, Hibbing 1986). Likewise, the failure of elected 
officials to significantly influence the bureaucracy does not necessarily guarantee 
bureaucratic unaccountability. In fact, within education, research on top down political 
control found that bureaucratic values far outweighed those of elected officials when 
creating outcomes. When looking at the influence of elected officials on student 
performance, the influence of elected officials and political appointees significantly 
declines once the authors control for bureaucratic impact (Meier and O’Toole 2006a). 
While this research is an example of the bureaucracy demonstrating more leverage than 
political officials would like, it also suggests that the bureaucracy may be responding to 
the desires of the public directly. 
The public has the ability to influence bureaucratic and government responsiveness 
by participating directly in the policy process. Because clients are not believed to have 
significant authority over bureaucrats and cannot discipline bureaucrats in the same way 
as their hierarchical superiors (Lipsky 2010), it is often contested that clients can 
influence bureaucratic actions and policy-making. However, clients do have a significant 
advantage of interaction that may potentially promote bureaucratic responsiveness and 
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democratic accountability. In fact, through the analysis of interviews and focus group 
statements, Selden et al (1999) note that one of the primary goals expressed by public 
agents was the perception of themselves as stewards of the public interest. In this study, 
the authors found strong evidence that agents saw themselves as serving the public and 
rejected being controlled by elected officials.  
Using bottom-up tools of accountability clients serve as an additional check on 
bureaucrats (Stivers 1994). Research by Waterman, Rouse, and Wright (1998) 
distinguished that federal bureaucrats work within different venues of influence. For 
some, Congress, the president, administrators, and courts loaded strongly as one 
category of political sponsorship. However, loading within its own factor was the media, 
public opinion, and interest groups. When the same survey was observed among state 
bureaucrats, client interest groups were said to interact directly and more intimately with 
bureaucratic actors. The authors, likewise, noted that the media, interest groups, and 
public opinion loaded within the same factor as Congress and the executive for state 
bureaucrats. Their results indicate that public interests are potentially as influential as 
traditional principals. Additional research on citizen participation indicates that citizens 
are more effective at holding bureaucrats accountable when interest groups are highly 
organized (Berry 1991, Berry et al 1984), there is high issue saliency, and administrative 
structures promote interaction (Berry 1979). 
At the local level bottom-up political control measures may be even more influential 
to the bureaucracy for a variety of reasons. The primary reason the bureaucracy may take 
their cues from bottom-up political actors is because of the unique relationship between 
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street-level bureaucrats and their clients. As frontline workers, street-level bureaucrats 
have the daily task of interacting with clients. In many local organizations where 
bureaucrats meet frequently with their clients, the likelihood of developing relationships 
and sharing information is greater. In fact, one of the tools of political control used by 
bottom up political actors is informal interest group communication with agency 
personnel (Berry 2015). This tool is likely to be used even more at the local level where 
the degree of separation between the client community and local bureaucrat is small. 
Although some research has found that out of multiple actors, the public had the least 
amount of influence on the federal bureaucracy (Furlong 1998); at the local level this 
relationship is likely to be different for the reasons listed above.  
In addition, as bureaucrats engage with clients and develop trust, clients can become 
a political resource that provides the bureaucracy with increased influence during the 
policy process. A significant resource provided by the public is increased information 
(Berry 1981). One of the central threats provoked by the bureaucracy is the information 
asymmetry between the agent and their elected principal (Waterman and Meier 1998). 
The fear that this information asymmetry will enable bureaucrats to act outside of the 
guidance of their principals is the reason political control mechanisms are used initially. 
However, as bureaucrats engage in close relationship with their clients, trust is 
developed between these two actors promoting government responsiveness (Yang and 
Pandey 2007). Within this relationship, the agent’s knowledge will only increase in 
comparison to their principal giving the agent more power to take independent action. 
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When the public looks upon their bureaucrats positively, they may also provide them 
with the indispensible resource of political support (Rourke 1984). This support not only 
extends from the positive relationship bureaucrats have with their clients, but also as a 
result of the negative or non-existent relationship clients have with elected officials. In a 
time where skepticism is high towards politics, it is likely that clients are more likely to 
develop relationships with bureaucrats who are also perceived as neighbors and 
community members, than elected officials who are often not visible within the 
community.  
As the public heightens their support behind bureaucratic actions and provides them 
with information, bureaucrats are empowered to act prior to or in spite of the calls from 
their executives (Rourke 1984). Literature on political interest groups indicates that the 
public as political support can result in the agent wielding power over their principals. 
As such, within local education, teachers have been known to wield their political power 
individually and as members of unions to influence elections and potentially flip the 
traditional principal-agent relationship (Moe 2006). Similarly, supportive public interest 
groups can advocate for racially-representative discipline outcomes in education, a 
position that bureaucrats support but often cannot pursue because it would put them in a 
unfavorable position with their executive. The support of the public can then become 
incredibly valuable in enabling agencies to oppose their principals (Rourke 1984).  
5.3 Data and Hypothesis 
With both top-down and bottom-up pressures on the bureaucracy, from whom are 
bureaucrats taking their cues? In order to explore this question, the research will employ 
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a national dataset that surveys the United States’ largest school districts in 2002, 2004, 
2008, and 2012. The data originates from the National School Survey distributed to 
school districts with more than 5,000 students as of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). 
The surveys were distributed by mail each year. Of the 5,493 districts surveyed there 
was a response rate of 94.5 percent. The survey requested data on each district’s school 
board elections, the characteristics of the current school board, and 
teacher/administrative representation. 
While school districts may at first glance appear to be an interesting context in which 
to study questions of top-down and bottom-up political control, this context does provide 
multiple advantages to explore the research question. Primarily, school districts are 
independent government organizations with a hierarchical political structure. Within 
each school district, a locally elected school board appoints school superintendents and 
administrators to oversee the district and individual school campuses. These 
administrators then hire teachers who operate as street-level bureaucrats with high levels 
of individual discretion. The local nature of public school implies that the community 
and public influence is present within the district. The public works to influence the 
behaviors of school board members, administrators, and teachers.  
In addition, this context provides an analysis of top-down and bottom-up political 
control within a local context that is not often discussed within this literature. Within 
public administration, the widespread support for overhead democracy creates a tradition 
where scholars fail to consider the direct effects of the public. The majority of studies on 
political control are then focused on the federal level, observing the relationship between 
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executives, political appointees, and federal bureaucrats. But, the local context of this 
study provides a case where there is a greater likelihood of direct engagement between 
the bureaucracy and public. In addition, at the school district level we can imagine a 
scenario where teachers interact with minority school board members with the same ease 
that teachers interact with parents. The distance between the bureaucrat and client is then 
similar to that of the bureaucrat and the executive, a phenomenon that is unlikely at the 
federal level. This provides an excellent case to compare the influence of elected 
officials and the public on bureaucratic behavior.  
The bureaucratic behavior studied here is bureaucratic representation. As mentioned 
previously, representation can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The literature has 
observed the influence of minority bureaucrats on policy (Roch et al 2010), client 
behaviors (Keiser et al 2002), and overall improved organizational outcomes for 
represented groups (Dee 2005, Meier 1993a).  Because this research looks at a variety of 
school districts, individual level data on bureaucratic actions and client actions are not 
available. However, descriptive data on overall organizational outcomes for racial 
minority groups are available.  
5.3.1 Variables 
To operationalize the dependent variable, I will use a high-achievement and low-
achievement indicator in public education (Meier and Rutherford 2016). The high-
achievement indicator is gifted and talented outcomes (Nicholson-Crotty et al 2011), 
measured by the percentage of Black and Latino students in gifted and talented programs 
in the district. The low-achievement indicator is discipline (Holt and Gershenson 2015), 
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measured by the percentage of Black and Latino students being expelled in the district. 
Education research indicates that the gap between minority students and their white 
peers are present across every achievement indicator from standardized test scores to 
graduation rates (Lee 2002). For the two measures used in this study, minority students 
are often overrepresented when it comes to discipline and underrepresented in high 
achieving academic programs (Gregory et al 2010).1 These outcome variables originate 
from data collected by the Office for Civil Rights. 
To operationalize the independent variable of top-down and bottom-up political 
pressure, I will use a measure of school board representation and public political opinion 
respectively. The measure of school board representation will include the percentage of 
Black and Latino school board members. As members of minority groups, these elected 
officials can empathize with the concerns of minority clients and often work toward 
minority interests. Similarly, minority school board members are not likely to be at odds 
with the goals of minority representation and therefore support teacher representative 
behaviors. The measure of public or bottom-up political pressure will be the percentage 
of the district that voted for the Democratic Party in the respective years. This ideology 
measure represents the public’s political preferences for a wide range of issues. Because 
the Democratic Party has historically been more supportive of racial minority issues in 
the past decade, a public that ideologically supports the party is likely to support teacher 
                                                 
1 Although a common measure would be minority student performance on standardized 
tests, the national nature of this data makes comparable test scores unavailable as a 
dependent variable. 
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representative behaviors. Last, Black and Latino teacher representation within the 
district will represent the bureaucracy.  
There are also a variety of control variables that will be used in this analysis. 
According to the education production function, school resources, community 
characteristics, and district administration are influential to student performance. I have 
included the following variables that are expected to benefit student performance: 
administrator representation, district educational attainment, district median income,2 
district instructional expenditures, and gifted and talented program size. In addition, I 
control for the following constraints, which are typical indicators of task difficulty: 
minority student population and the percent of all students expelled.  
5.3.2 Methods 
Using OLS regression analysis with separate interaction analyses for the school 
board and the public, I can observe the influence of these actors on the relationship 
between minority teachers and student outcomes. Within the data it is necessary to 
control for spatial heterogeneity and wide changes across time. I cluster the data at the 
district level and include time fixed effects to address these data concerns. Therefore, the 
remaining coefficient will indicate the average effect within a district, controlling for the 
year. By comparing the predicted values of minority teacher representation on minority 
student outcomes given the different political interests, the analyses indicate whether the 
school board or the public will influence teachers more effectively.  
                                                 
2 Education attainment and income are measured by these values within the minority 
population being observed. 
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5.3.3 Hypothesis 
Given the unique relationship between local bureaucracy and clients, I expect that 
bottom-up political influence from the public will have a greater effect on bureaucratic 
actions toward representation than pressure from elected officials. Recent findings tested 
within education speaks to this relationship as Meier and Rutherford (2016) illustrate 
that minority representation in school districts was ineffective in Republican districts 
compared to Democratic districts. Within this study minority teachers and elected 
officials are potentially taking cues from the public context where the majority of 
citizens may not support the active representation of minority interests.  
Therefore bottom-up political pressure can work to promote and/or interrupt 
bureaucratic behavior. There are two reasons to expect this relationship. First, as 
mentioned previously, the public provides bureaucrats with political resources, in the 
form of political support and information, which can potentially empower the 
bureaucrat. The acquisition of these resources is dependent, however, on the 
participation of the public with bureaucracy. In many administrative programs it is 
worthwhile to ask if individual participation is common. Yet, in the context of this 
research, there is increased pressure among educational professionals to communicate 
often with parents in order to best address the needs of students. The opportunity for 
participation is available through parent-teacher conferences, parent-teacher association 
meetings, and informal communication when needed. Through this communication, 
educators share information with parents and gain information from them. For instance, 
in the gifted and talented assignment process, oftentimes students are tested for the 
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program at the request of their parent. However, in many communities of color, the 
importance and availability of such programs are often unknown. Teachers, then, can act 
as a representative to help identify students for the program and/or share the benefits of 
this program with parents who do not have previous experience with gifted 
programming (Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom et al 2016).  
In addition, as clients, the public is often very aware of the shortcomings of public 
programs. Because they interact directly with these programs, clients can share with 
bureaucrats various ways to address problems. As community members, clients only 
think of these issues in the context of their community. As such, they often know more 
appropriate ways to address the issue. To illustrate, research found that citizens helped to 
co-create environmental policy solutions in a majority Latino neighborhood. The author 
explains that by sharing methods that aligned with the economic, political, and social 
context of the community, citizens provided contextual expertise to develop more 
effective policies (Corburn 2007). Likewise, in some cases, research has found it is the 
knowledge and expertise of public interests that have been able to gain the attention of 
and develop communication with bureaucratic agencies (Berry 1981). Therefore, when it 
comes to school discipline, I would expect that many parents provide suggestions to 
teachers to address discipline concerns before expelling students. Contemporary interests 
point to methods such as providing students with a chance to learn how to better solve 
problems, teaching students conflict-resolution skills, and understanding student 
communication and intent from a cultural perspective (Gaines 2016). 
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Here political distance plays an important role because clients are likely only to share 
information where there is community and trust developed with the bureaucrat. 
Developing trusting relationships are more likely between the public and street-level 
bureaucrats than elected officials. This relationship is strong primarily because 
bureaucrats maintain two identities, as bureaucrats and citizens. The bureaucracy as an 
institution is intended to promote values among bureaucrats that support citizen 
development (Cook 1992). Clients then potentially have a strong influence on 
bureaucrats not only because they are more willing to share information with bureaucrats 
who are neighbors/friends, but also because bureaucrats may connect better with the 
public as they encourage the sharing of political ideas and solutions. While, school 
elected officials do provide public forums in the form of open school board meetings 
where they hope to hear public opinion and gain information, research indicates that 
public meetings may not serve its purpose in allowing citizens to directly influence 
school board decisions (Adams 2004). Yet, citizens can pursue a more accessible venue 
to influence policy through informal and consistent communication with teachers.  
Second, bureaucratic actions toward representation are less likely to be influenced by 
elected officials because of the procedural requirements elected officials must follow 
before policy change. While minority representatives are aware of the concerns and 
achievement gaps facing their community, their desire to address these issues with 
formal policy may lengthen the process. For instance, when creating policy elected 
officials must go through a process of researching, developing, presenting, voting, 
approving, and implementing changes. Creating a new process of gifted identification or 
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an intervention for students needing discipline requires resources and time these officials 
are often not provided. As a result, elected officials may not have clear plans or policy 
changes to suggest to bureaucrats.  
In addition, elected actors are concerned with public support and re-election 
outcomes (Canes-Wrone et al 2001). Research (Weaver 1986) indicates that politicians 
are more concerned with avoiding blame for unpopular decisions. For those who 
experience a fear of upsetting community members who do not agree with their policy 
positions and where racial representation is an issue that promotes tension, school board 
officials may limit their agenda to avoid the loss of some public support. As such, they 
may not pressure bureaucrats to promote representation. Given the various dynamics at 
play between clients, bureaucrats, and elected officials, I anticipate the following 
relationship: Bottom-up political actors will have a greater effect on bureaucratic 
representation than top-down political actors. 
5.4 Findings 
Beginning with high achievement indicators, table 6 indicates that both school board 
and the public positively influence minority teacher effectiveness for minority gifted and 
talented placement. The significant relationship for both political actors is not 
surprisingly. In fact, I expect that in many districts, when similar interests of the school 
board and public aggregate Black teachers will experience support from both actors to be 
representatives. Because on many occasions we expect the two political actors may 
complement each other, by comparing the predicted marginal effects of each interaction 
separately I hope to get a glimpse at the independent effects.  
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Therefore table 7 compares the predicted marginal impact at one standard deviation 
below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean. The results 
indicate that the ability of Black teachers to improve Black G/T representation is greater 
in districts with Democratic support. Moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean, the predictive marginal impact of average Black 
teacher representation increases the Black G/T population from 6.9 percent to 9.1 
percent. This growth outweighs the growth experienced across average levels of Black 
school board representation. These predicted outcomes imply that Black representatives’ 
behaviors are highly related to the public and political landscape of the district. This may 
be a result of higher levels of Black citizen political engagement or the importance of 
community organizing within Black communities. Nonetheless, Black bureaucratic 
representation is highly influenced by the publics’ politics in their district. 
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Table 6. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Black G/T 
 Black G/T Black G/T 
Black Teacher -0.0905* -0.569*** 
 (0.0442) (0.081) 
Black School Board -0.0361 - 
 (0.028)  
Democrat Voting - -0.042*** 
  (0.012) 
Black Teachers x Black School 
Board 
0.008*** - 
 (0.0008)  
Black Teachers x Democrat 
Voting 
- 0.016*** 
  (0.002) 
Black Administrators -0.0268 -0.005 
 (0.0375) (0.044) 
Black Students 0.498*** 0.453*** 
 (0.0294) (0.028) 
Black College Grads -0.0152* 0.00007 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Black Income 1.212*** 0.753** 
 (0.31) (0.272) 
Instructional Expenditures 0.312 -0.995 
 (0.774) (0.783) 
G/T Program Size 0.099*** 0.089*** 
 (0.02) (0.018) 
2004 0.382 -0.513 
 (0.547) (0.545) 
2008 -0.341 0.049 
 (0.355) (0.346) 
2012 -1.031 -0.201 
 (0.596) (0.584) 
Constant -15.12* 1.359 
 (6.849) (6.746) 
N 2934 3399 
R2 0.81 0.8 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 7. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Black Teachers 
and Black G/T 
 -1 SD Mean +1 SD 
Black School Board 6.81 7.11 7.7 
 (0.322) (0.194) (0.481) 
Democratic Voting 6.9 7.8 9.1 
 (0.205) (0.149) (0.210) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
All values have p<0.01 
 
For high achievement indicators within the Latino community, however, similar 
results are not found. First table 8 indicates positive yet insignificant trends across both 
political actors. Instead, when comparing predictive margins within the Latino 
community, representation cues are more effective when coming from top-down 
political actors.3 The predicted values in Table 9 indicate that on average, the marginal 
effect of Latino teachers on Latino gifted and talented students increases to a greater 
degree with an increase in school board rather than Democratic Party representation. For 
instance, moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the 
mean of Democratic Party representation, the results indicate very little growth in Latino 
G/T representation (less than 1 percent). When compared to similar changes across 
Latino school board representation, Latino teacher impact on G/T representation grows 
from a predicative 10 percent to 14.5 percent. While these results may indicate 
differences between Latino and Black political ideology, it may also indicate a different 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that in neither equation does the marginal effect of teachers 
change across levels of school board representation or district partisanship. However, the 
predicted value is significantly different from zero in both cases.  
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method of Latino representation. Research on Latino superintendent representation and 
English language learner (ELL) programs found that superintendents influenced 
representation by distributing resources in the form of teachers to ELL programs 
(Theobald 2007). Similarly, Latino bureaucrats may be more effective representatives 
when supported by Latino elected officials. This is increasingly probable if these 
officials recruit Latino bureaucrats with a purpose to address certain needs. For example 
the board may intend to expand gifted programming and hope to serve Latino students 
within these programs; as a result they may hire more Latino teachers to help identify 
and serve these students.  
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Table 8. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Latino G/T 
 Latino G/T Latino G/T 
Latino Teachers 0.191* 0.427* 
 (0.076) (0.165) 
Latino School Board 0.198*** - 
 (0.043)  
Democrat Voting - 0.009 
  (0.015) 
Latino Teachers x Latino 
School Board 
0.001 - 
 (0.001)  
Latino Teachers x Democrat 
Voting 
- -0.001 
  (0.002) 
Latino Administrators -0.059 0.085 
 (0.06) (0.057) 
Latino Students 0.546*** 0.547*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
Latino College Grads 0.051*** 0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Latino Income -0.911 -1.270** 
 (0.513) (0.432) 
Instructional Expenditures -1.888* -1.942* 
 (0.94) (0.884) 
G/T Program Size 0.161*** 0.168*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) 
2004 -1.002 -1.216* 
 (0.598) (0.553) 
2008 0.652 0.64 
 (0.395) (0.396) 
2012 2.240** 2.991*** 
 (0.77) (0.68) 
Constant 20.19* 23.11** 
 (7.964) (7.179) 
N 2907 3392 
R2 0.86 0.85 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 9. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Latino Teachers 
and Latino G/T 
  -1 SD Mean +1 SD 
Latino School Board 10.03 11.26 14.56 
  (0.306) (0.266) (0.716) 
Democratic Voting 11.33 11.35 11.37 
  (0.315) (0.189) (0.283) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
All values have p<0.01 
 
Next, table 10 indicates the influence of top-down versus bottom-up pressures on 
low-achievement outcomes. The hypothesis expects that teachers will take their cues and 
be more effective representatives as the percentage of the public voting for the 
Democratic Party increases. Our findings for Black expulsion rates are similar to that of 
Black G/T and support this hypothesis. Across average levels of Black school board 
representation, Black teachers potentially decrease Black expulsion rates by less than 0.5 
percent. However, moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation 
above the mean Democratic Party support, Black teachers decrease Black expulsion 
rates by 1 percentage point. It is clear again that Black teachers seem to be more 
effective at improving Black student outcomes in Democratic districts. Yet, the small 
impact experienced in both analyses indicates that expulsions are a much more difficult 
performance measure to change. This difficulty and the results found might imply that 
expulsion rates speak to a larger community issue that requires community/parent 
support and engagement to address broader concerns of discipline.   
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Table 10. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Black 
Expulsions 
  Black Expulsions Black Expulsions 
Black Teachers 0.165 0.580** 
  (0.116) (0.213) 
Black School Board 0.029 - 
  (0.065)   




Black Teachers x Black School 
Board -0.006** - 
  (0.002)   
Black Teachers x Democrat 




Black Administrators 0.053 0.037 
  (0.092) (0.087) 
Black Students 0.907*** 0.918*** 
  (0.067) (0.057) 
Black College Grads 0.039 0.027 
  (0.027) (0.026) 
Black Income -1.297 -1.108 
  (0.873) (0.779) 
Instructional Expenditures -6.296** -5.900** 
  (2.043) (1.895) 
Total Expulsions 7.178*** 7.305*** 
  (2.046) (1.913) 
2004 -3.052* -2.855* 
  (1.382) (1.338) 
2008 -10.48*** -10.66*** 
  (1.225) (1.187) 
2012 2.667 1.031 
  (1.905) (1.69) 
Constant 67.72***   
  (18.6) (16.86) 
N 2933 3398 
R2 0.44 0.437 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 11. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Black Teachers 
and Black Expulsions 
 -1 SD Mean +1 SD 
Black School Board 20.7 20.49 20.06 
 (0.851) (0.581) (1.165) 
Democratic Voting 19.93 19.52 18.91 
 (0.691) (0.463) (0.623) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
All values have p<0.01 
 
When observing Latino expulsions, similar to Latino G/T outcomes again it is not 
the public that influences effective representation but the school board. In fact, average 
Democratic voting is not statistically significant for teacher representation and may have 
the opposite effect. Moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation 
above the mean Democratic Party support, Latino teachers are related to a predicted 
increase of 15.6 to 16.5 percent Latino expulsions. Compared to the impact of Latino 
teachers across averages of Latino elected officials, it appears that Latino teachers are 
taking cues from their political superiors. Across average levels of Latino school board 
representation, Latino teachers are predicted to decrease Latino expulsions by 0.5 
percent.  Although these results fail to support our hypothesis, the surprising positive 
impact of Latino teachers and Democratic Party support on expulsions implies 
interesting dynamics between the Latino community and local Democratic Party.  
As alluded by these and previous findings, Latino bureaucrats may fail to see 
Democratic Party support as support for Latino representative behavior. This may be a 
result of the wary support Latinos provide the Democratic party. In addition, although 
Latino communities are facing many of the same problems as African-American youth, 
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Latino citizens may not engage in the same type of co-productive, political engagement 
as their Black counterparts. These results may then be the failure of local Democratic 
parties to provide a space of community organizing for Latino citizens. As such, there 
may be less promotion of the inequalities experienced by their students and fewer public 
efforts to address them.  
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Table 12. The Effect of Political Actors on Teachers Representation and Latino 
Expulsions 
 Latino Expulsions Latino Expulsions 
Latino Teachers -0.019 0.034 
 (0.163) (0.322) 
Latino School Board -0.021 - 
 (0.068)  
Democrat Voting - 0.055 
  (0.034) 
Latino Teachers x Latino 
School Board 
-0.002 - 
 (0.002)  
Latino Teachers x Democrat 
Voting 
- -0.003 
  (0.005) 
Latino Administrators 0.369** 0.221 
 (0.122) (0.118) 
Latino Students 0.720*** 0.739*** 
 (0.056) (0.047) 
Latino College Grads 0.0019 -0.005 
 (0.026) (0.025) 
Latino Incomes -0.192 0.111 
 (1.045) (0.875) 
Instructional Expenditures -10.14*** -10.58*** 
 (1.987) (1.848) 
Total Expulsions 2.783*** 3.187*** 
 (0.745) (0.748) 
2004 -5.029*** -5.133*** 
 (1.306) (1.231) 
2008 -7.262*** -6.988*** 
 (1.133) (1.099) 
2012 1.827 0.102 
 (2.016) (1.519) 
Constant 88.81*** 87.42*** 
 (17.87) (15.24) 
N 2907 3392 
R2 0.54 0.53 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 13. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Latino Teachers 
and Latino Expulsions 
 -1 SD Mean +1 SD 
Latino School Board 17.7 17.49 16.92 
 (0.613) (0.540) (1.195) 
Democratic Voting 15.61 15.99 16.55 
 (0.645) (0.413) (0.567) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
All values have p<0.01 
 
Across all models various control variables are influential to these relationships. 
For instance, program size, minority student population, and instructional expenditures 
influence student outcomes in the ways expected. Interestingly, representation among 
school administrators is not as influential for minority outcomes when including district 
partisanship or school board representation. This may be a result of the public working 
directly with bureaucrats or administrators allowing teachers to take on the duties of 
representing minority student interests (Meier and O’Toole 2006a). Last, minority 
educational attainment and income were not consistently significant for student 
outcomes. Although the education production function would expect parent education 
and income to influence these outcomes, much of that research is focused on non-
minority communities and may not have the same consistent effects given the outcome 
variables observed here. 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Within most bureaucracies, street-level bureaucrats receive pressure from different 
actors to take action and behave in a way that will influence client performance. 
However, given the different relationships between the bureaucracy and political actors, 
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bureaucratic behavior may be cued in response to some but not all actors. This study 
sought to understand from whom are minority representatives in the bureaucracy taking 
their cues: are bureaucrats empowered to be more effective bureaucrats when supported 
by their hierarchical political principal or the public?  
The findings indicate that in fact both political actors may be effectively influencing 
bureaucratic representation. But the answer also depends on the minority community in 
question. When observing the relationship between Black teachers and student 
outcomes, both high and low achievement indicators are greater in a Democratic school 
district. This indicates that within these districts Black teachers are more effective 
representatives because the community may potentially vocalize their support of 
bureaucratic active representation. While an increase in school board representation can 
lead to an increase in Black teacher effectiveness as well, the maximum impact is not as 
substantively significant as that found in Democratic districts. This result implies that in 
Democratic districts where there is no minority elected representation, minority teachers 
may be able to effectively influence minority student outcomes in spite of elected 
officials by leaning on the support of their public political community. 
Similar results, however, were not found within Latino communities. In fact, the 
opposite occurred for both high and low achievement indicators. The data indicate that 
Latino teachers take cues of representation not from partisanship within the public but 
Latino elected officials. Essentially this result implies that Latino teachers are more 
comfortable and more likely to take on an active representative role when there are co-
minority school board members who will potentially support their behavior. This result 
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does fail to support the hypothesis, but given the community observed there are reasons 
why this may occur. I expect most likely that the insignificant relationship between 
teacher representation and district partisanship is a result of the small ties between the 
Latino community and the Democratic Party. Unlike African-Americans who experience 
a much longer history and somewhat positive relationship with the Democratic Party, a 
similar relationship may not exist for Latino communities (Michelson 2005). In fact, 
many Latino communities struggle to participate politically and are skeptical of 
partisanship within the United States (Shaw et al 2000). Because Latinos lack political 
incorporation, there also exists low political trust and high internal efficacy within the 
community (Marschall 2001). The presence of a Latino elected official, therefore, may 
help improve trust among Latino bureaucrats and foster political activity towards 
representation.  For this reason, Latino teachers may feel that the costs of active 
representation are minimized when hierarchical political principals support their 
behavior rather than the public. In addition, the results of chapter four indicate a similar 
occurrence where Latino social capital negatively affects Latino educational outcomes. 
Together both results highlight a difference between Latino community and political 
engagement that may not be easily comparable to their African-American peers. 
Additional research exploring partisanship within the Latino community may help 
explain these results. 
Essentially these results imply once again that bureaucratic politics is highly 
dependent on context. Within this chapter the context in question appears to be the 
minority political context and the education context. First, different minority 
  125 
communities may have different relationships with various political actors. Those with 
close relationships within the community or with political parties may be more 
comfortable incorporating and responding to public interests directly. Yet, those who 
have closer ties with individual political principals may look to elected officials when 
taking action.  
The education context may create certain limitations as well. Within public 
education, bureaucracy is focused on the public and teacher/parent relationships. For 
bureaucracies that are less focused toward the public, the political influence of the public 
may not overwhelm that of elected officials. This phenomenon is precisely one of the 
reasons why research at the federal level often indicates the significance of the executive 
and their appointees. Although this may be perceived as a limit to the generalizability of 
this study, I believe it is a contribution. This limitation exemplifies why it is important to 
explore the influence of political actors at the local level.  
Last, the results of this study are limited because it compares political actors who are 
statistically correlated with each other. Essentially in the U.S. Black and Latino elected 
officials are likely to be represented at least descriptively in the Democratic Party 
setting. While it would be appropriate to see how these political actors work together 
instead of comparing the two, the collinearity of the data does not provide this type of 
analysis.4  
                                                 
4 A three-way interaction between teacher representation, school board representation, 
and district partisanship was insignificant across outcomes.  
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Nonetheless, this study does provide a contribution across literatures. First to the 
representative bureaucracy literature, this chapter illustrates that minority bureaucrats do 
take cues from political actors before pursuing active representation. While the 
representative bureaucracy literature often assumes active representation, this research 
implies that minority representatives are more or less effective at improving minority 
outcomes depending on the support of political actors within their organizational 
context.  
This research also contributes to the literature on political control. Studies of political 
control are often focused on the federal bureaucracy and dismiss the potential effect of 
the public. Yet, bottom-up pressures can be influential to bureaucratic behavior and 
outcomes at the local level where bureaucrats waiver between two identities of 
bureaucrat and community member.  The relationships developed within this context 
will potentially affect bureaucratic behavior far more than pressure from elected 
officials.  
Finally, within the field of education focus on minority student outcomes has 
consistently grown in the past decade. Other than research that explores school board 
representation, little research explores the political dynamics working within school 
districts. This research has done just that in explaining that both top-down and bottom-
up political pressures influence teacher behaviors.  Because teachers play such a crucial 
role in eliminating the gap between minority students and their peers, additional research 
on the role of district politics and teacher behaviors in public schools should be pursued. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
As minority clients face disparities in various public programs, the importance of 
representation to potentially address these disparities is crucial. Yet, if there are barriers 
that potentially disrupt effective representation, it is necessary to recognize and 
potentially tap into resources that can assist in promoting positive outcomes for minority 
clients. The story of the Pulaski County Special School district (presented in the 
introduction) illustrates a district that successfully achieved minority representation 
across performance outcomes because of their various advocacy efforts that included 
resource adjustments, community development, and political support (Grantham 2003).  
Throughout this dissertation I have outlined first the importance of representation on 
minority client outcomes. But additionally I have explained that bureaucrats will have 
difficulty being successful when the proper support is not provided to them. In chapter 
three I describe one of the most visible contexts from which support is necessary, the 
organization’s economic climate. Empirically, I find that racial minority representation 
is in fact influenced by financial stress in the organization. And, the type of resources 
will matter. A simple increase in total resources has a limited effect on representation. 
However, changes in instructional expenditures can potentially provide additional slack 
to bureaucratic actors and provide bureaucrats with room for movement and assistance 
in their daily work. As in the PCSSD district, chapter three’s results illustrate that if an 
organization seeks to truly improve minority representation they must first dedicate 
resources to improve the infrastructure and create the opportunity for effective growth.  
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Second, this dissertation proceeds to illustrate that community context can create a 
support network for bureaucratic representation. Within the Black community, a higher 
level of Black social capital is related to an increase in the marginal effect of Black 
teachers on Black students in G/T courses. For Latino communities, Latino social capital 
independently decreased Latino student achievement. But when coupled with the efforts 
of Latino bureaucrats, Latino students experienced gains in gifted and talented 
representation and a decline in discipline. These results indicate that social capital within 
minority communities can be a large asset for minority teacher representation. And as 
members of the community, bureaucrats are in a unique position to reach out to the 
community and maximize their engagement efforts. Thus, without getting Black parents 
on board, administrators in PCSSD may still be facing concerns of underrepresentation 
in their gifted programing. Yet, given the community group in question, community 
engagement may be a unique challenge for many public programs. In order to further 
client understanding of bureaucratic services, bureaucrats particularly in low social 
capital communities should first learn the challenges and strengths facing their client 
community.  
Last, in the fifth chapter, I explore how different types of political control actors will 
impact representation. Historically, in order to achieve goals of representation and 
equity, minority political actors have pursued multi-level governance. In other words, 
minority political and bureaucratic actors add to the efforts of each other. In various 
works of literature (Meier et al 2004, Meier and Stewart 1991), Black and Latino school 
members, lead to racial minority school administrators, and the hiring of more Black and 
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Latino street-level bureaucrats. Together, representation at each level contributes to 
minority outcomes, although street-level bureaucrats are most influential. The results of 
this chapter speaks to this literature, but the differences between Latinos and African-
Americans found in this study do indicate that multilevel governance and representation 
may take effect differently in the two communities. The data illustrate that while Black 
teacher representation was related to an improvement in Black student outcomes in 
Democratic districts, Latino teacher representation successfully improved Latino student 
outcomes when there was top-down Latino representation on the school board.  
The literature on Latino political participation potentially speaks to these differences 
as it indicates that Latino candidates on the ballot spur Latino voter participation 
(Barreto et al 2005).1 Similarly, Latino representation on the school board may activate a 
Latino group consciousness and spur bureaucratic efforts toward active representation. 
Although African-Americans do indeed experience a similar type of political activation, 
there is also a greater sense of political cohesion among Black communities that may 
promote political advocacy among Black bureaucrats. The Black community’s political 
organization may then serve as an additional source of political pressure on Black 
bureaucrats. Thus, similar to the ways in which PCSSD knew political voices within the 
Black community were influential to their efforts, local bureaucrats must use constituent 
political groups and/or state political representatives to further their goals of equity. 
 
                                                 
1 Similar findings have been noted within African-American communities and 
participation as well (Tate 1991).  
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6.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 In 2015, O’Toole and Meier collaborated and developed a more general theory of the 
importance of organizational context on public management. The theory suggests that 
management matters to various degrees given the political, environmental, and internal 
context of the organization. In this research, I extend their theory as a framework for 
effective representation. In the contemporary representative bureaucracy literature, there 
is a tendency to assume that active representation and its positive outcomes will 
eventually manifest in organizations with some degree of passive representation. Some 
literature, has called this into question by asserting that organizational socialization may 
still operate as a barrier to active representation (Wilkins and Williams 2008, Carroll 
2016). Yet, I would argue that active representation is more dependent on the 
organization’s ability to support bureaucrats’ representative behaviors in the face of 
external constraints rather than on the bureaucrats themselves. When framed in this 
manner, active representation is not just a behavior that develops organically once more 
minorities are a part of the bureaucracy. Instead, this research presents evidence that 
active representation can be approached as an intentional process if organizations 
develop the proper venues to support its success.  
 Surprisingly, this research has also produced outcomes that are concerning for the 
representative bureaucracy literature in regards to different minority communities. 
Particularly, the inconsistencies of chapters four and five call attention to the fact that 
there is no model of bureaucratic representation that fits both Black and Latino 
communities alike. The difference in findings that are consistent across these two 
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chapters may potentially indicate very unique characteristics about the Latino 
community.  First, Latino community involvement may distinctly differ from other 
minority groups. This difference is potentially a result of the various identities that make 
up Latino communities and the lack of political cohesion resulting from various national 
backgrounds (Meier and Melton 2012). In addition, when Latinos are not a numerical 
majority political engagement and networking may suffer (Meier and Melton 2012). In 
research on community involvement, Marschall (2001) finds that the motives of 
participation are different for Latinos and African-Americans. For Latinos common 
political attitudes are a sense of political mistrust and a high sense of efficacy. African-
Americans on the other hand are motivated by high efficacy and trust, signally a sense of 
political integration within the community (Marschall 2001). Where increased levels of 
partisanship and community organization are not the norm, one would not expect these 
venues of public engagement and support to influence outcomes. Likewise, if a base 
sense of political efficacy, participation, and engagement with government services 
contributes to bureaucratic representation, its inconsistent nature within the Latino 
community may be responsible for the varying accounts of Latino bureaucratic 
representation.  
Finally, public support may be represented in entirely different ways for the Latino 
community. The research of Rodney Hero (2003) points to similar discrepancies in that 
social capital does not have an independent positive effect on minority student outcomes. 
Within my research, these findings were the case for overall levels of social capital as 
well as social capital within minority groups. This implies that Black and Latino 
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networks and norms of interaction may not be captured in measures of voting, 
participating in a boycott, or volunteering to fix a community problem. Thus, the ways in 
which we measure and theoretically conceptualize public social capital and community 
involvement for white communities may not extend to minority groups. 
6.2 Future Research: Suggestions to the Scholar 
Although this research seeks to explain the micro-processes that underlie 
bureaucratic representation, like most studies of representative bureaucracy it does so 
using a large N quantitative dataset. One of the benefits of this approach is that the 
nature of the dataset allows readers to view reliable relationships within the data. 
However, if we truly want to understand the micro-processes of representation, a 
qualitative approach to representation may help to uncover various inquiries that still 
remain. For instance, broad questions regarding how minority bureaucrats perceive 
themselves as representatives and if their representative behavior is dependent on 
administrator support have yet to be addressed. Additional research on this topic should 
consider many of the assumptions made in the literature broadly and even within my 
own research.  
In addition, bureaucracies are operating in community contexts that are much more 
multi-racial than the segregated communities of the past. The possibility of cross 
minority group representation may assist in representation efforts. Particularly, do Latino 
and African-Americans serve as active representatives for racial minority students that 
are not of their same-race? Former research on coalition building indicates that Latinos 
and African-Americans are unlikely to be first choice coalition partners (Meier and 
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Stewart 1991, Rocha 2007). Nonetheless, research of attempts toward cross minority 
group representation and successful coalitions should continue. These are just a few of 
the research questions that will help to shed light on representation as a bureaucratic 
process and help to improve minority public outcomes toward equity.  
6.3 Policy Implications: Suggestions to the Practitioner 
Public bureaucracies are under increased scrutiny to increase representation among 
their workforce. And calls for minority bureaucrats are noted in both public education 
and local law enforcement. Organizational barriers, however, still remain in these 
agencies that do not fully support active representation from minority bureaucrats. There 
are resources, however, that matter for representation. For instance, the amount of 
economic resources the agency decides to invest in minority programs will benefit the 
representative efforts of their bureaucrats. Likewise, developing and tapping into the 
proper community and political support networks are critical for bureaucratic co-
production.  
I would argue that practically this implies that bureaucracies must look beyond 
simply improving their passive representation. Passive representation will not produce 
the desired substantive outcomes until public organizations ensure that resources exist 
for active representation. Therefore, local administrators must make an effort to invest in 
their bureaucrats, mend relationships with local minority communities, and understand 
the various community politics that empower representation. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
This appendix provides the supplementary material for chapter three, “Mo’ Money, 
No Problem: The Impact of Financial Stress on Representation.” Table 14 provides 
summary statistics for the models in chapter three. The interactive models for both total 
revenue and instructional expenditures changes with fixed effects are found here as well 
(Table 15-Table 18). These models provide additional robustness checks.  
 
Table 14. Chapter 3 Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Standard Deviation Min Max 
Black Teachers 7.228 12.686 0 99 
Latino Teachers 6.344 12.991 0 99 
Total Revenue 0.055 1.431 -5.09 3.624 
Instructional Expenditures 0.045 0.448 -1.324 1.248 
Black Administrators 10.648 16.042 0 100 
Latino Administrators 6.315 13.92 0 100 
Black College Grads 17.627 14.415 0 100 
Latino College Grads 15.301 12.574 0 100 
Black Income 22071.33 23532.74 0 330000 
Latino Income 22351.72 22178.14 534.5 215707 
Democrat Voting 47.527 12.498 9.962 93.818 
Total Enrollment 9.231 0.757 3.045 13.864 
Black Gifted and Talented 6.905 13.947 0 100 
Latino Gifted and Talented 9.362 18.223 0 100 
Black Expulsions 14.926 26.742 0 100 
Latino Expulsions 12.639 25.045 0 100 
G/T Program Size 6.625 6.398 0 100 
Total Expulsions 0.206 0.721 0 40.851 
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Table 15. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black G/T (w/ 
Fixed Effects) 
 Black G/T Black G/T 
Black Teachers -0.0401 0.00871 
 (0.0265) (0.0282) 
Total Revenue -0.00803 - 
 (0.485)  
Black Teachers x Total Revenue -0.0194 - 
 (0.00997)  
Instructional Expenditures - 0.215 
  (1.012) 
Black Teachers x Instructional 
Expenditures 
- 0.0747*** 
  (0.0188) 
Black Administrators 0.0601* 0.0513* 
 (0.0236) (0.0232) 
Black Students 0.364*** 0.390*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0628) 
Black College Grads 0.0224 0.0208 
 (0.0228) (0.0225) 
Black Income 0.0974 0.0534 
 (0.697) (0.69) 
Total Enrollment -0.513 0.478 
 (1.705) (1.698) 
Democrat Voting 0.049 -0.0697 
 (0.475) (0.47) 
G/T Program Size 0.102*** 0.096*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0274) 
2008 -0.61 -1.298 
 (0.494) (0.99) 
2012 0.487 -0.35 
 (1.393) (1.263) 
Constant 1.535 -3.551 
 (17.05) (16.91) 
N 2273 2275 
R2 0.99 0.99 
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported  
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Table 16. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino G/T 
(w/ Fixed Effects) 
Table A.3: The Effect of Latino Teachers and Funding on Gifted and 
Talented Students 
 Latino G/T Latino G/T 
Latino Teachers 0.285*** 0.144** 
 -0.0547 (0.0517) 
Total Revenue -0.191 - 
 (0.813)  
Latino Teachers x Total Revenue -0.098*** - 
 (0.0159)  
Instructional Expenditures (IE) - -0.255 
  (1.753) 
Latino Teachers x IE - 0.235*** 
  (0.0306) 
Latino Administrators -0.0929 -0.103* 
 (0.0493) (0.0484) 
Latino students 0.593*** 0.647*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0944) 
Latino College Grads -0.019 -0.0425 
 (0.0577) (0.0565) 
Latino Income 1.081 -0.773 
 (1.155) (1.112) 
Total Enrollment 3.09 4.221 
 (2.864) (2.812) 
Democrat Voting 0.26 0.0435 
 (0.928) (0.914) 
G/T Program Size 0.394*** 0.386*** 
 -0.0468 (0.0462) 
2008 -0.657 -1.24 
 (0.892) (1.725) 
2012 1.083 1.131 
 (2.33) (2.225) 
Constant -50.75 -38.27 
 (31.86) (31.29) 
N 2256 2258 
R2 0.98 0.98 
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported  
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Table 17. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black 
Expulsions (w/ Fixed Effects) 
 Black Expulsions Black Expulsions 
Black Teachers 0.282 -0.00468 
 (0.164) (0.175) 
Total Revenue -4.279 - 
 (2.999)  
Black Teachers x Total Revenue 0.104 - 
 (0.0617)  
Instructional Expenditures - -1.084 
  (6.247) 
Black Teachers x Instructional 
Expenditures 
- -0.429*** 
  (0.116) 
Black Administrators 0.116 0.166 
 (0.146) (0.144) 
Black students 0.65 0.456 
 (0.392) (0.391) 
Black College Grads -0.0756 -0.0602 
 (0.141) (0.14) 
Black Income -4.733 -4.439 
 (4.307) (4.28) 
Total Enrollment 11.5 7.137 
 (10.54) (10.53) 
Democrat Voting -0.952 -0.525 
 (2.93) (2.913) 
Total Expulsions 8.146*** 7.760*** 
 (1.984) (1.97) 
2008 -14.82*** -7.33 
 (3.077) (6.093) 
2012 13.23 9.667 
 (8.599) (7.802) 
Constant -38.18 -14.35 
 (105.4) (104.9) 
N 2273 2275 
R2 0.85 0.86 
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported  
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Table 18. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino 
Expulsions (w/ Fixed Effects) 
 Latino Expulsions Latino Expulsions 
Latino Teachers -0.193 -0.146 
 (0.185) (0.176) 
Total Revenue -0.252 - 
 (2.755)  
Latino Teachers x Total Revenue -0.00848 - 
 (0.054)  
Instructional Expenditures (IE) - -3.818 
  (5.946) 
Latino Teachers x IE - -0.354*** 
  (0.104) 
Latino Administrators 0.259 0.251 
 (0.167) (0.165) 
Latino students 0.21 0.222 
 (0.327) (0.321) 
Latino College Grads -0.155 -0.152 
 (0.195) (0.192) 
Latino Income 5.179 5.317 
 (3.92) (3.796) 
Total Enrollment 12.03 11.01 
 (9.688) (9.566) 
Democrat Voting -0.868 -0.558 
 (3.14) (3.109) 
Total Expulsions 3.063 3.067 
 (1.823) (1.802) 
2008 -7.882* -1.757 
 (3.051) (5.834) 
2012 -6.583 -2.914 
 (7.884) (7.563) 
Constant -132.5 -136.4 
 (107.9) (106.6) 
N 2256 2258 
R2 0.87 0.87 
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported  
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001   
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4 
 This appendix provides supplementary materials for chapter four, “It Takes a 
Village: Minority Social Capital, Representation, and Student Performance.” Table 19 
presents the summary statistics for the data in chapter four. Tables 20-23 list the models 
associated with the figures in chapter four.  
 
Table 19. Chapter 4 Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Public Social Capital -0.258 1.463 -2.872 9.295 
Latino SC -0.52 1.26 -2.66 8.74 
Black SC -0.34 1.37 -2.86 8.67 
G/T Program 6.53 6.35 0 100 
Total Expulsions 0.21 0.71 0 40.85 
Black G/T 6.79 13.87 0 100 
Latino G/T 9.37 18.23 0 100 
Black Expulsions 14.69 26.61 0 100 
Latino Expulsions 12.62 25 0 100 
Latino Students 18.82 23.38 0 99.9 
Black Students 15.75 19.95 0 99.71 
Latino Administrators 6.36 13.88 0 100 
Black Administrators 10.57 16.12 0 100 
Black Teachers 7.17 12.74 0 99 
Latino Teachers 6.39 12.92 0 99 
Total Revenue 8.7 1.35 2.75 14.069 
White Education 23.37 13.22 0 100 
Latino Education 15.45 18.7 0 100 
Black Education 17.29 20.86 0 100 
Democrat Voting 47.53 12.49 9.96 93.82 
Median Income 64015.7 16784.48 26009 137216 
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Table 20. The Impact of Social Capital on Social Opportunity 




Public Social Capital -0.061 -0.006 
 (0.108) -0.013 
Total Revenue -0.717 0.047 
 (0.377) (0.029) 
White Education 0.134*** -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.001) 
Latino Education -0.052* -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.0009) 
Black Education 0.061** -0.0004 
 (0.023) (0.0007) 
Total Enrollment 0.974*** 0.017 
 (0.223) (0.017) 
Black Students 0.005 0.004* 
 (0.009) (0.002) 
Latino Students 0.006 -0.0009 
 (0.008) (0.0008) 
Democrat Voting -0.038* -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.002) 
Median Income -0.108 -0.194* 
 (0.969) (0.076) 
2004 -1.254 0.241* 
 (1.049) (0.119) 
2008 -2.066 0.097 
 (1.143) (0.097) 
2012 -1.485*** 0.115** 
 (0.374) (0.037) 
Constant 3.533 1.952** 
 (11.41) (0.755) 
N 2606 2606 
R2 0.09 0.02 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 21. The Impact of Overall Social Capital on Minority Outcomes 
 Black G/T Black Exp. Latino G/T Latino Exp. 
Public Social Capital 0.157 0.36 -0.440* 1.422** 
 (0.189) (0.496) (0.172) (0.528) 
Black Administrators -0.01 -0.188 - - 
 (0.088) (0.131)   
Black Teachers 0.361** 0.061 - - 
 (0.124) (0.154)   
Black Students 0.495*** 0.877*** - - 
 (0.053) (0.088)   
Black Education -0.008 0.078 - - 
 (0.014) (0.05)   
Black Income 1.229* -3.022* - - 
 (0.54) (1.322)   
Latino Administrators - - 0.034 0.186 
   (0.072) (0.133) 
Latino Teachers - - 0.320** -0.0344 
   (0.1) (0.138) 
Latino Students - - 0.636*** 0.730*** 
   (0.036) (0.053) 
Latino Education - - 0.163*** -0.0481 
   (0.025) (0.046) 
Latino Income - - -3.618*** -2.301 
   (0.872) (1.886) 
Total Revenue 1.057* -2.751* 1.110* -6.489*** 
 (0.436) (1.224) (0.436) (1.094) 
Democrat Voting 0.057* -0.041 -0.008 -0.039 
 (0.026) (0.067) (0.031) (0.056) 
G/T Program Size 0.062* - 0.207*** - 
 (0.026)  (0.042)  
Total Expulsions - 8.573*** - 6.774*** 
  (1.774)  (1.523) 
2004 2.679 -6.177 2.725* -16.28*** 
 (1.402) (3.435) (1.363) (3.297) 
2008 2.089 -18.84*** 4.379** -30.57*** 
 (1.407) (3.424) (1.453) (3.524) 
2012 -2.967* 1.156 5.116*** 3.325 
 (1.195) (2.602) (1.472) (3.522) 
Constant -25.94*** 59.03*** 15.46 85.32*** 
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Table 21. Continued from previous page 
 (6.87) (16.71) (8.897) (21.05) 
N 1415 1415 1417 1417 
R2 0.76 0.39 0.87 0.56 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 22. The Impact of Minority Social Capital on Minority Outcomes 
 Black G/T Black Exp. Latino G/T Latino 
Exp. 
Black SC 0.187 0.492 - - 
 (0.204) (0.549)   
Latino SC - - -0.534** 1.786** 
   (0.188) (0.595) 
Black Administrators -0.007 -0.18 - - 
 (0.089) (0.133)   
Black Teachers 0.361** 0.024 - - 
 (0.126) (0.158)   
Black Students 0.491*** 0.911*** - - 
 (0.053) (0.08)   
Black Education -0.009 0.087 - - 
 (0.014) (0.051)   
Black Income 1.385* -3.237* - - 
 (0.571) (1.36)   
Latino Administrators - - 0.033 0.179 
   (0.072) (0.133) 
Latino Teachers - - 0.317** -0.018 
   (0.102) (0.136) 
Latino Students - - 0.635*** 0.740*** 
   (0.036) (0.053) 
Latino Education - - 0.172*** -0.063 
   (0.026) (0.047) 
Latino Income - - -3.864*** -1.913 
   (0.908) (1.952) 
Total Revenue 1.046* -2.817* 1.225** -6.641*** 
 (0.453) (1.263) (0.452) (1.125) 
Democrat Voting 0.059* -0.044 -0.012 -0.031 
 (0.027) (0.068) (0.031) (0.057) 
G/T Program Size 0.062* - 0.209*** - 
 (0.027)  (0.043)  
Total Expulsions - 8.440*** - 6.924*** 
  (1.822)  (1.541) 
2004 2.578 -5.76 3.072* -16.82*** 
 (1.472) (3.549) (1.416) (3.379) 
2008 2.063 -19.23*** 4.937** -32.06*** 
 (1.451) (3.513) (1.564) (3.696) 
2012 -3.176** 1.33 5.470*** 2.649 
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Table 22. Continued from previous page. 
 (1.227) (2.614) (1.51) (3.629) 
Constant -
27.35{*** 
61.42*** 16.66 83.21*** 
 (7.255) (17.18) (9.223) (21.71) 
N 1361 1361 1377 1377 
R2 0.76 0.41 0.87 0.56 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 23. The Impact of Minority Representation and Social Capital on Minority 
Outcomes 
 Black G/T Black Exp. Latino G/T Latino Exp. 
Black SC -0.312 0.844 - - 
 (0.274) (0.92)   
Black Teachers 0.049 -0.104 - - 
 (0.059) (0.196)   
Latino SC - - -1.008** 1.822 
   (0.379) (1.236) 
Latino Teachers - - 0.095 -0.535** 
   (0.063) (0.205) 
Black SC x Black Teachers 0.106*** -0.0762 - - 
 (0.017) (0.058)   
Latino SC x Latino Teachers - - 0.055* -0.177* 
   (0.025) (0.081) 
Black Administrators 0.168*** -0.096 - - 
 (0.046) (0.154)   
Black Students 0.454*** -0.7 - - 
 (0.111) (0.37)   
Black Education 0.019 -0.006 - - 
 (0.056) (0.189)   
Black Income 0.865 -9.089 - - 
 (1.549) (5.214)   
Latino Administrators - - 0.016 0.027 
   (0.048) (0.156) 
Latino Students - - 0.557*** 0.714* 
   (0.101) (0.332) 
Latino Education - - 0.001 -0.266 
   (0.101) (0.328) 
Latino Income - - -0.519 6.526 
   (2.043) (6.664) 
Total Revenue 0.514 1.644 0.882 -3.485 
 (0.608) (2.035) (0.715) (2.328) 
Democrat Voting -0.819 -0.33 0.049 1.313 
 (0.742) (2.485) (1.001) (3.258) 
G/T Program Size 0.099* - 0.322*** - 
 (0.042)  (0.049)  
Total Expulsions - 11.23*** - 5.449* 
  (2.325)  (2.504) 
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Table 23. Continued from previous page 
2004 1.647 5.925 2.014 -10.4 
 (1.654) (5.527) (1.95) (6.338) 
2008 0.464 -4.697 4.751* -20.87** 
 (1.636) (5.485) (2.077) (6.798) 
2012 -1.052 11.72 2.316 -6.989 
 (2.262) (7.598) (3.131) (10.22) 
Constant 29.55 100.4 -7.892 -83.84 
 (42.57) (142.7) (56.51) (184) 
N 1361 1361 1377 1377 
R2 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.85 
Standard Errors reported below coefficient 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 5 
 
 This appendix provides the supplementary materials for chapter five, “It’s All About 
Politics: Minority Representation and Political Control.” Table 24 lists the summary 
statistics for the data used in chapter five.  
 
Table 24. Chapter 5 Summary Statistics 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Black School Board (%) 10.038 17.257 0 100 
Latino School Board (%) 6.279 16.871 0 100 
Democratic Voting 47.527 12.498 9.962 93.818 
Black Teachers 4.711 12.036 0 100 
Latino Teachers 4.079 10.795 0 100 
Black Administrators 6.993 17.427 0 100 
Latino Administrators 3.912 12.613 0 100 
Black G/T 4.471 12.562 0 100 
Latino G/T 6.539 15.447 0 100 
Black Expulsions 8.638 22.561 0 100 
Latino Expulsions 7.309 20.666 0 100 
Black Students 12.348 21.104 0 100 
Latino Students 14.834 21.301 0 100 
Black College Grads 17.296 20.863 0 100 
Latino College Grads 15.445 18.701 0 100 
Black Income (logged) 9.952 0.884 5.974 12.707 
Latino Income (logged) 10.149 0.885 6.281 12.413 
Instructional 
Expenditures (logged) 
8.616 0.475 2.198 12.598 
G/T Program Size 4.971 6.67 0 100 
Total Expulsions 0.189 0.768 0 40.851 
 
 
